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Abstract
Employee fraud in financial institutions is a considerable monetary and reputational risk. Studies
state that this type of fraud is typically detected by a tip, in the worst case from affected customers,
which is fatal in terms of reputation. Consequently, there is a high motivation to improve analytic
detection. We analyze the problem of client advisor fraud in a major financial institution and find
that it differs substantially from other types of fraud. However, internal fraud at the employee
level receives little attention in research. In this thesis, we provide an overview of fraud detection
research with the focus on implicit assumptions and applicability. We propose a decision frame-
work to find adequate fraud detection approaches for real world problems based on a number
of defined characteristics. By applying the decision framework to the problem setting we met at
Alphafin the chosen approach is motivated. The proposed system consists of a detection compo-
nent and a visualization component. A number of implementations for the detection component
with a focus on tempo-relational pattern matching is discussed. The visualization component,
which was converted to productive software at Alphafin in the course of the collaboration, is in-
troduced. On the basis of three case studies we demonstrate the potential of the proposed system
and discuss findings and possible extensions for further refinements.
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1
Introduction
This thesis studies the application of data mining and graph pattern matching techniques in com-
pliance and risk related topics within a financial institution. The main focus lies on internal or
employee fraud. Based on the findings, solutions to practical challenges in this problem field
are proposed. A detection system, which has shown its potential under real world conditions, is
introduced.
The research background originates from a collaboration with a major financial institution. To
simplify matters, the collaborating company is called Alphafin within this thesis. Alphafin’s fraud
specialists, based on their expertise and prior tests, doubted common analytic fraud detection
methods (like profiling) to be effective for the special case of internal fraud. A research project
was started to further investigate the subject and to propose feasible solutions.
After concentrating on internal fraud, the focus was shifted to anti-money laundering related
topics in a second stage, where the developed solutions were adapted and extended for the new
application area. The findings of both stages are presented in this work.
Considering the common dichotomy of IT and Business in the financial sector, this thesis resides
on the interface between the two positions. The design process is heavily influenced by both
worlds on all abstraction levels. In particular, the developed algorithms are specialized to meet
the practical requirements in a straightforward way.
In the course of this thesis, we tried to combine the perspectives of academia and industry on
the one hand, and of informatics and business on the other hand. While being a computer science
thesis, this work also intends to address the technically interested business expert. Although a
very short introduction is given, basic knowledge of data mining and graph theory is assumed.
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Relevant business information is given to the possible extent in the presence of non-disclosure
agreements with Alphafin.
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1.1 Motivation
The main background of this thesis is the mitigation of financial and reputational risk. Direct
financial risk arises from losses caused by internal fraud. If a customer notices unjustified irregu-
larities in his/her assets or if a bank is associated with internal fraud cases in the media, the effect
can be a substantial loss in reputation. Losing reputation is losing trust, which is the foundation
of banking business per se [Geiger, 2008]. Customers losing trust in their bank will withdraw
their assets and terminate the business relation. It is therefore crucial for a financial institute to
get employee fraud under control and, at best, give the impression that there is no such thing as
internal fraud.
Improving a fraud detection system is typically about reducing a very high false positive rate1.
False positives, which have to be investigated before being identified as what they are cause costs
without direct benefit. Additionally, false alerts can upset the persons concerned. Nobody likes
to be suspected. In the special case of internal fraud, these people are employees. Violating the
mutual trust is dangerous for a company, as it can lead to a reduction in employee morale and loy-
alty. Minimizing this risk can be accomplished by identifying false positives before the involved
person has to be informed or interrogated, e.g., by using a system which allows a holistic view
on suspicious transactions. On the other hand, fraud detection systems may help to increase the
expected risk for committing fraud. In ”Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, the au-
thor suggests that the decision to commit a crime is based on a conventional cost-benefit analysis
[Becker, 1968]. Knowledge or assumptions about sophisticated fraud detection systems and/or
uncovered cases may therefore raise the inhibition threshold. However, at least at Alphafin, an
analysis of known fraud cases questions the assumption of a rational cost-benefit decision as il-
legal behavior often seems to emerge from frivolity — and subsequent desperation (see section
2.1.2). Disclosure or concealment of the existence of fraud detection systems and uncovered cases
is a classical tradeoff between deterrence and divulgement of informational advantage (see Figure
1.1).
The setup and configuration of detection systems in a company like Alphafin is a non-trivial
1= a very high number of ”false alerts”,i.e. instances which are reported by the system as suspicious but turn out to be
unobjectionable in evaluation.
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undertaking with high complexity. For example, new work flows have to be built and integrated,
accounting for the highly confidential nature of the data. Adjusting and tuning system param-
eters requires comprehensive knowledge about the business and data. A common way to keep
complexity and costs as low as possible is the limitation to — from an academic point of view —
basic and well-known detection approaches, as e.g. plain threshold monitoring. This motivates
the search for more expressive solutions which still meet the demands in terms of straightfor-
wardness and feasibility.
For a profit-oriented company, evaluation of numerous novel approaches is typically out of
scope. On the other hand, specialized commercial vendors may have the resources to do experi-
mentation, but normally do not have access to the real data of their customers, which complicates
the process. Academic research is a possible way to fill the gap and propose expressive but feasi-
ble approaches.
Figure 1.1: The employee information tradeoff
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1.2 Problem Definition
Fraud detection suggests itself to be defined as an information-retrieval (IR) or precision/ recall prob-
lem2. This requires the definition of the class of relevant items. One obvious possibility is to define
relevant items as “fraud”. At Alphafin, there is a number of reasons why this is problematic:
• Relevant activities may not be limited to explicit fraud, and a clear boundary between fraud
and non-fraud may be hard to define. A certain behavior may be, for example, legal, but
not compliant to company policies or, in an even weaker form, noneconomic and therefore
undesirable. What is of interest for investigators may be fuzzy and may change over time
or depend on variables which cannot be observed.
• Only a subset of the information which is necessary to clearly identify fraud is available in
machine-readable format. This may be due to missing access authorization or to incompat-
ible media formats. Investigators may proceed outside of the system as soon as a suspicion
substantiates, for example in the form of interrogations and the review of free-text docu-
ments.
• As mentioned above, the human factor is crucial in the fraud finding process. The definition
of “fraud” as relevant items mingles user experience with system accuracy.
An alternative is therefore the definition of a relevant item as ”data of sufficient interest for
the user” (hot spots) . Although this definition is less formal and quantification is difficult, it is
more convenient for the actual problem. However, identification of precision and recall remains
a challenge:
• The true recall is, by definition, unknown. To calculate recall, all fraud (or “interesting”)
data has to be known without exception, which is only possible if the problem we try to
solve is already sorted out.
• Precision may be assessable, but its optimal value is not necessarily ”one” as in typical
IR-Systems. Users may want to see the “border” between interesting and uninteresting
behavior. Even more, this border may become only clear in the process of analyzing the
retrieved data. The system may be used not only for hot spot detection, but also (and at the
2For more information on information retrieval, see e.g. [Singhal, 2001]
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same time) for learning about previously unknown structures in the data. Precision may
not be an adequate quality measure in this case.
We therefore redefine the problem at hand more generally as computer-assisted hot spot identifi-
cation for domain experts. The quality measure is the work efficiency and effectiveness when using
the system based on expert assessment.
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1.3 Hypothesis
Our main hypothesis is the following: “It is possible to combine and extend available data mining
or pattern matching techniques to build a novel, feasible and valuable internal fraud detection
system complementing existing solutions”. In the process of this thesis, design decisions led to a
number of sub-hypotheses which will be mentioned in the appropriate passages.
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1.4 Approach Overview
Our approach consists of two main components: a detection component and a result evaluation
component.
The detection component provides the functionality to detect and retrieve hot spots in the data.
This component is not a black box — the user is able to configure and adapt the detection algo-
rithms. Different specialized implementations for this component are proposed in this thesis. The
implementations vary in complexity and strategy for handling huge amounts of data, represent-
ing different points on the classical memory/runtime tradeoff .
The relational and temporal nature of the data and the properties of suspicious transaction pat-
terns implicates that detected hot spots are extremely hard to investigate in the usual tabular data
view. Therefore, an evaluation component, which relies heavily on visualization, was developed. It
is tailored to the needs of internal fraud investigators, accounting for the special characteristics
of internal fraud, which is described in closer detail in the following chapter. The insights from
evaluation can be used to reconfigure the detection component, allowing a refining and learning
process.
Figure 1.2: A very high level system overview
The evaluation component can be used without the detection component. In this case, hot
spots are not identified automatically, but user-driven, for instance based on customer complaints
or other hints. This mode is called ad-hoc search. The first stage of the collaboration with Alphafin
focused exclusively on the design and development of the visualization component as it was
required to get access to the data.
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1.5 Contributions
This thesis is application oriented. Therefore the main contributions result from finding the best
way to solve a real-world problem. We provide an answer to the following question: “How
can existing work be adapted and applied to deliver a detection approach for the special case of
employee fraud under real world conditions?”
Related contributions are:
• We analyze the potential of data mining and pattern matching techniques for internal fraud
detection within a financial institution.
• We elaborate on the assumptions on which existing data mining solutions build and propose
a framework to support the choice of a fraud detection approach in various settings.
• We discuss crucial issues of introducing fraud detection systems in financial institutes.
• We provide a fraud detection approach which stands the test of applicability under con-
straining conditions.
• We propose a number of potential paths building on this work and justify why preliminary
steps were necessary.
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1.6 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows.
First, we introduce the problem field and the attendant circumstances. We analyze the char-
acteristics of internal fraud and related topics. The real world constraints, which played a major
role in this work, are described. We then refer to related work with a focus on data mining and
pattern matching approaches and discuss their applicability.
Second, we present our solution approach. We describe the system design and introduce
different implementations for the detection component with their advantages and disadvantages.
Third, we discuss application aspects. The findings when evaluating on real data are given.
For the sake of completeness, evaluation on synthetic data is delivered.
To conclude, we discuss the limitations of our approaches. Part of those limitations is sup-
posed to be conquerable with future work. We introduce ideas for future research which in our
opinion possess potential but were out of scope for this thesis.
2
Fundamentals, Premises and
Related Work
2.1 Fundamentals in Risk and Compliance
Needless to state: fraud is a huge and very diverse area, which can be looked at from numerous
possible views (e.g. from the social, legal, economic, or analytical perspective). We will keep the
general information on fraud very short and focus on aspects which are of particular interest for
this thesis. Consider the following possible definitions for the general term of fraud found in
literature:
• “Intentional deception resulting in injury to another, as when a person makes false state-
ments, conceals or omits material facts.”[Fitch, 2006]
• “The abuse of a profit organizations system without that abuse leading necessarily to legal
consequences”[Phua et al., 2005]
• “Criminal deception; the use of false representations to gain an unjust advantage”[Bolton
and Hand, 2002]
• “In law, the deliberate misrepresentation of fact for the purpose of depriving someone of a
valuable possession or legal right”[Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006]
• “A false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed that deceives
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and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to her or his legal
injury.”[Jeffery Lehman, 2004]
The concepts of deception and misrepresentation at the damage of another individual are com-
mon terms for defining fraud — which is not surprising. As mentioned above, the term fraud
denotes a wide and heterogeneous scope of activities. Prominent examples of fraud areas are
• Insurance fraud (e.g. fraudulent car or health insurance claims)
• Telecommunications fraud (phone cloning, subscription fraud)
• Investment fraud (pyramid schemes, insider trading)
• Employee fraud (falsification of balance sheets, embezzlement)
• Credit Card fraud (stolen or cloned credit cards)
• Retail fraud (forgeries, fake sales)
• Advance fee fraud (Nigerian money offer, lottery scam)
• Computer and internet fraud (Phishing, Spoofing,. . . )
As for example in computer and internet fraud, a clear differentiation between fraud areas
and fraud instruments is not always straightforward. Instead of undertaking the definition of an
exhaustive taxonomy of this broad field, we narrow our focus to known fraud schemes in the
field of banking.
• Cheque fraud
Cheques can be stolen, altered to an illegitimate payment recipient and higher transaction
amount (adding a few digits) and/or provided with a forged signature or even be com-
pletely forged. The area of cheque fraud alone is a complex field, where, to our knowledge,
detection is typically a highly manual process. Suspicious properties of hand- or machine-
written cheques are recognized by trained human experts.
• Trading fraud
An employee may trade sizeable assets on behalf of a customer or the bank without cus-
tomer order. If invested money is lost, trading can become even more intense and aggres-
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sive in the hope to cover the loss. This behavior led to some of the largest bank frauds ever
detected [Clark and Jolly, 2008]
• Loan fraud
Fraudulent loan applications as a form of external fraud can contain false information to
hide financial problems. Also, employees may knowingly approve loans to accomplices
who declare bankruptcy or vanish after receiving the money.
• Forged documents
Forged documents (not only cheques and credit slips) can be used to trigger or cover illicit
transactions.
• Bill discounting fraud
This type of external fraud is on hand when a customer builds up confidence with a bank.
Accomplices will readily and repeatedly pay bills issued by the customer (and raised by the
bank). After successfully simulating reliable behavior, the customer requests that the bank
settles its balance with the company before billing the customer. As soon as the outstanding
balance between the bank and the company is large enough, the customer disappears with
the money and his/her accomplices.
• Payment card fraud
Payment cards can be stolen, duplicated or skimmed by various means. Obtaining the re-
quired information can for example be accomplished by manipulating ATMs.
• Identity theft
This type of fraud works by obtaining information about an individual and using this infor-
mation to apply for identity cards, accounts and credit in that persons name. Various ways
of obtaining the required information are possible (e.g. indiscreet insiders or phishing).
• Trick fraud
This summarizes fraud which is based on tricking legitimate account owners into paying
money to the fraudster. Variants are simulating a “prime bank” with promising conditions,
impersonating officials, forged emails and other pishing attacks.
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• Computer fraud
Technical attacks, in particular aimed at the identification and authentication mechanisms
of e-banking solutions, is a type of relatively new bank fraud.
• Money laundering
can also be seen as a special kind of bank fraud which aims at hiding the true (illicit) origin
of funds.
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Categories (Level 2) Activities Examples (Level 3)
Unauthorized activity Transactions not reported (intentional)
Transaction type unauthorized (with monetary loss)
Mismarking of position (intentional)
Theft and fraud Fraud/ credit fraud/ worthless deposits
Theft/extortion/embezzlement/robbery
Misappropriation of assets
Forgery
Check kiting
Smuggling
Account take-over / impersonation etc
Tax non-compliance/ evasion (willful)
Bribes/ kickbacks
Insider trading (not on firms account)
Table 2.1: Basel II categories and activities for event type category Internal Fraud
2.1.1 Internal Fraud
In the Basel II accord1 [Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision, 2006], loss events from opera-
tional risk are broken down into seven general categories, of which one is Internal Fraud. The
committee defines it as
“Loss due to acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or circumvent
regulations, the law or company policy, excluding diversity / discrimination events, which
involves at least one internal party ”
The categories and activities examples for the event type category Internal Fraud defined in Basel
II are listed in table 2.1.
Another definition is given by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE):
“The use of ones occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or
misapplication of the employing organizations resource or assets.”
Extensive analysis in the field of occupational fraud from a business-oriented view has been
done and published in particular by ACFE , whose annually Reports to the Nation on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse are freely available [Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008]. The authors
propose an extensive occupational fraud and abuse classification system (see Figure 2.1). Another
1The Basel II accord forms recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.
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valuable information source is the series of papers in internal fraud management by the Santa Fe
Group2. In our thesis, we will therefore just point out the most important findings in a nutshell
before focusing on the characteristics of the internal fraud cases we analyzed at Alphafin.
2http://santa-fe-group.com/whitepapers
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The 2008 Report to the Nation [Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008] based on data com-
piled from 959 cases of occupational fraud between January 2006 and February 2008 found that
• Participants of the study estimated that U.S. organizations lose 7% of their annual revenues
to fraud, translating to approximately 994 billion dollars in fraud losses.
• The median loss in the analyzed cased is 175’000 dollars and one quarter of the cases in-
volved losses of at least one million dollars.
• The typical fraud case lasted two years from starting the fraudulent behavior until its detec-
tion.
• The most common fraud schemes were corruption (27%) and fraudulent billing schemes
(24%), while financial statement fraud was the most costly category with a median loss of
two million dollars.
• Despite increased focus on anti-fraud controls in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley [Sarbanes and
Oxley, 2002] and mandated consideration of fraud in financial statement audits due to SAS
99 [Jeffery Lehman, 2002], the data shows that occupational frauds are much more likely to
be detected by a tip (46%) or by accident (20%) than by audits (28.5%), controls (23.3%) or
any other means.
• Implementations of anti-fraud controls appear to have measurable impact on an organiza-
tions exposure to fraud.
• Banking ranges as the industry with the second largest median losses (250000 dollars) only
exceeded by the manufacturing industry (441000 dollars).
• Occupational fraudsters are generally first-time offenders and work in the accounting de-
parture or upper management.
• Fraud perpetrators often display behavioral traits that serve as indicators of possible illegal
behavior (e.g. living beyond their apparent means or experiencing financial difficulties at
the time of fraud).
An article in Bankers Hotline[Bankersonline, 1992] states that “money laundering gets all the
publicity, but there are numerous areas where fraud and theft take place in a financial institution”.
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Figure 2.1: Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification System as proposed in ACFE’s 2008 Report to the Nation
[Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008]
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The authors furthermore state that employees steal because they “truly believe they won‘t get
caught”and “feel overworked and underpaid and are out to ”get back” the financial institution”.
This may gain brisance in times of a financial crisis with reputational challenges and job insecu-
rities. In their initial paper on the current landscape of internal fraud, the Santa Fe Group warns
that criminal activity occurring inside financial institutions extends far beyond material gain for
the individual employee, but may feed activities of fraud rings and other criminal groups around
the globe. In their Forensic Fraud Barometer 2009 [Osborne, 2009] KPMG reports that “fraud nears
record levels in 2008 and worse to come” in the UK with ”over £1.1bn of fraud nationwide, the
second highest level in 21 years”.3 Summarizing these insights, we can state that even when ig-
noring reputational losses (which seems to be the case in the reports cited above), internal fraud
causes considerable damage. The high level of fraud cases revealed by hints indicates that applied
monitoring solutions may have room for improvement. A fraud which is only revealed after the
deceived customer complains is a worst case scenario concerning reputation in particular for the
banking business, which relies highly on customer trust.
3http://www.yhff.co.uk/Fraud
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2.1.2 Internal Fraud at Alphafin
We conducted extensive discussions with fraud experts and an analysis of available fraud case
reports to gain knowledge about internal fraud cases at Alphafin. As we are not allowed to
communicate details of fraud cases due to non disclosure agreements, we present our findings in
a summarized form which nevertheless can be used to explain our design decisions in the later
parts of this thesis.
Introduction
As mentioned above, a wide variety of internal fraud exists both at the management and em-
ployee level. The focus we were given at Alphafin is customer advisor fraud.
A customer advisor manages the accounts of the assigned clients4. Client types can range from
small private savers to huge corporate customers. As customers are extremely heterogeneous (not
only in the size of their assets) customer contact may range from barely existent to good personal
relationships. Customer advisors are authorized to trigger transactions concerning their clients
assets, under certain conditions without explicit and written customer order. For simplicity, we
assign the Manual Transaction Type (MTT) to all such transactions. MTT transactions are needed
to allow for flexibility in customer service. This entails the augmented necessity of appropriate
control mechanisms. If the amount of a MTT transaction exceeds a defined threshold, operational
control measures kick in. Below this threshold, monitoring solutions are needed to handle the
large amount of daily processed data.
It is worth noting that while MTT is assumed to be more prone to fraudulent activities, a cus-
tomer advisor may avail himself of other transaction types in combination with counterfeiting
required documents and other instruments which are also used by external fraudsters. However,
the internal fraudster may have a superior knowledge in comparison to his/her external counter-
part. In [Luell, 2005], we listed the premises a client advisor potentially has to commit fraud:
• Detailed knowledge of internal processes and systems (and maybe security flaws)
• Required authorizations to trigger transactions
4Customers can have several accounts. Legal bodies in turn may be represented by more than one “customers”. As
this does not affect our explanations (but is, however, crucial at a more detailed level which is confidential), we treat the
terms customer and account interchangeably in this thesis.
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• Knowledge of (usual) behavior and alertness of managed customers
• Fundamental confidence from co-workers and subordinates.
Prominent Elements of Fraud Cases
In the following we list elements which repeatedly occurred in analyzed fraud cases:
Illegitimate speculative trading An important element and often the motivation for further il-
legal behavior is illegitimate speculative trading. Consider a customer advisor which persuades
his clients to approve highly speculative trading transactions promising high profits without suf-
ficiently exposing the connected risks. At the loss of the money the employee tries to minimize
the customers financial damage to avoid a customer complaint uncovering the fallible behavior.
A more blatant variant is the trading without any customer knowledge, let alone order. The in-
tention is typically to generate profit for personal enrichment without the customer ever learning
about the transactions. If the trading does not result in profit, but in loss, the disappearance of
assets needs to be covered to avoid exposure.
Extensive asset shifting No matter if money is lost in trading or withdrawn to an unjust benefi-
ciary, numerous transactions are necessary to conceal and obscure the transfers. One purpose for
rearranging and shifting money in complex patterns is the temporary balance of missing amounts
in the wake of examinations. Another goal is the concealment of the true origin (or destination) of
monetary shifts. Doing so, a fraudster will typically act with caution and try to hide such trans-
fers in the mass of legal transactions. The comparatively low amounts of fraudulent transactions
(see below) ease the concealment. Similar behavior — but typically at a much bigger scale — is
known from the field of money laundering where it is called Layering [Altenkirch, 2006].
Exploitation of weakly supervised accounts Not every account is regularly checked by the
owner. A fallible customer advisor will know about the accounts which are largely unattended.
An attentive customer which regularly receives and checks his/her financial asset documents will
soon spot irregularities. More suitable victims do not have a clear overview regarding their as-
sets and barely receive or read documentation. Illustrative examples are highly aged customers
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without any affinity for financial affairs and little assistance from their environment. A customer
advisor we were allowed to interview stated that a notable number of customers show only min-
imal interest in their assets. However, we were not able to verify if this is generally true.
Exploitation of diverse vulnerabilities in processes and systems As the information may be
highly specific to our industry partner, details are both confidential and of very limited gener-
alizability. It is, however worth stating that, while some of the weaknesses can be eliminated
after being revealed, this is not true for all. Some soft spots may be intrinsically tied to process
efficiency and flexibility. Processes and systems cannot be always optimized for maximal security.
Gradual increase of fraudulent transactions Fraudsters will typically start with very cautious,
scarce transactions and gradually intensify the activity as the confidence not to be caught increases
over time. It is tempting to try again what worked once.
Single perpetrators, no organized crime While it may be attractive for organized crime to in-
filtrate companies with the goal to steal data, doing the same to steal money may not be the best
choice (at least in the situation at hand). The (expected) level of supervision, identifiability and
non-repudiability is too high. As stated before, we are concerned with opportunity crime and acts
of desperation after minor or major offenses. We didn’t meet a single case where a collaboration
of several fraudulent employees was observed or an employee was involved in organized crime.
Experts repeatedly affirmed that organized external or internal accomplices are highly unlikely.
However, it is imaginable that a fraudster incorporates unsuspecting subordinates or customers
to a certain level.
Relatively static, recurrent fraudulent behavior As a consequence of low professionalism, in-
ternal fraud as we met it is typically less sophisticated than elaborate external fraud or anti-money
laundering methods where fraudsters quickly adapt to new situations and circumvent new de-
tection systems. As perpetrators are not able, nor trying to learn from each other, observed fraud-
ulent behavior is relatively static over time, apart of course from subsequently closed flaws.
Extremely rare occurrence We found very rare occurrence of internal fraud. Of course, this
observation is solely based on revealed cases. A rough estimate of fraudulent transactions in the
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given data set with a time window of the two most recent years lies in the range of 1× 10−7% to
5 × 10−7% of all transactions5. This value is considerably lower than the ones reported in [Phua
et al., 2005], giving an overview of fraud vs. legal ratios in the data sets used in related work.
While most of the data sets exhibit fraud proportions between 10% and 25%, the lowest ratio
declared is 0.1% in [Kim et al., 2003b; Cahill et al., 2002].
No generalizable delinquent profile Fraud experts at Alphafin reported that an extensive project
was conducted with the goal to describe “the typical fraudster”in terms of age, duration of em-
ployment and so on in order to identify periled employees. The findings were that a profile could
not be defined due to the small number of examples and the considerable heterogeneity which
was much higher than expected.
Low transaction amounts Basically, additional control mechanisms kick in if a defined thresh-
old is exceeded which complicates covering. Beyond this, fraudsters are well aware that the
higher transactions are, the higher is the risk that they cause a stir. So amounts of fraudulent
transactions are kept as low as possible. Needless to say, on the other hand the expected profit
has to be worth the risk so trifle amounts will also not occur in fraudulent transactions.
Recurring patterns (Chain Transactions, Smurfing) This characteristic is closely connected to
the extensive asset shifting. As these patterns are central for the design of our approach, we will
discuss them in greater detail in the following section.
On Recurring Fraud Patterns
In the visual analysis of known cases we encountered a number of patterns which were confirmed
by fraud experts to recurrently serve as indicators for fraudulent behavior in manual investiga-
tion. Those patterns can be summarized under the terms Transaction Chains and Smurfing activ-
ities. Transaction Chains and Smurfing are well-known instruments for concealing actions in a
wide variety of illegal activities.
5only accounting for internal fraud
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We define a Transaction Chain as follows:
Definition 1 A transaction chain is the transfer of money from a source to a target via 1-n intermediary
points (e.g. accounts) within a short time period (typically one to a few days) where the amount of money
leaving the source approximately equals the amount of money arriving at the target.
Each of the three roles (source, intermediary, or target) has its unique characteristics and impli-
cations for suitable accounts taking this role. The detour over one or more intermediary nodes
is typically necessary to avoid the obvious transfer from a basically suspicious constellation of
source to target accounts. Money is typically only kept for a short time at intermediary accounts
because they are no safe harbors. Chains can also emerge from efforts to balance discrepancies on
victim accounts on a short-term basis. In this case, a loop chain where the source and target node
are identical is also possible. Structuring or Smurfing denotes the splitting of money transfers into
numerous smaller transactions for further concealment. Figure 2.2 shows examples of different
complexity. In its most simple form, a chain consists of single, approximately equal transactions
(a). In a more elaborate version, the transferred money is broken into several smaller transactions
from one station to the other (b). Another possibility is the distribution of the amount to several
intermediaries (and/or targets ) (c) . While complex pattern incorporating structuring may seem
“more promising”for a fraudster at first sight, this technique requires more triggered transactions
and is more laborious. A fraudster may want to avoid this because he/she feels (i) safer initiat-
ing as few transactions as possible as additional transactions increase the possibility of random
discovery, or (ii) so safe that he/she avoids the additional work and delay in setting up elaborate
Structuring. Interestingly, even though these patterns may be well known they seem to play a
relevant role in internal fraud.
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Figure 2.2: Transaction Chains and Smurfing
Why the Focus on Transaction Chains and Smurfing?
While our approach allows to define and retrieve a wide variety of patterns where the relation
of attribute values between nodes and/or edges in the graph6 are of special interest, we focus on
Transaction Chains and Smurfing patterns. The reasons for this decision are the following:
• These patterns have repeatedly been observed in connection with fraud cases. However,
none of these cases has been revealed on the basis of these patterns as adequate monitors
do not exist.
• The assumption seems reasonable that these patterns occur independently from the ex-
ploitation of specific flaws. They may therefore have a higher general discriminative power
than vulnerability specific patterns as the according weaknesses may be closed by opera-
tional measures.
• Although chains and smurfing are denoted as typical of fraud by experts, we encountered
6Accounts (or customers) and transactions between them can be interpreted as a graph, where accounts represent
nodes and transactions represent edges in the graph. This perspective is common for structural analysis, for example in
Social Network Analysis [Wasserman and Faust, 1994].
26 Chapter 2. Fundamentals, Premises and Related Work
comparatively low knowledge about their discriminative power. How common these pat-
terns are in legal behavior and under what circumstances they may occur is largely un-
known. To evaluate this and provide the knowledge to human experts has become one of
the goals of this thesis. This implies that we do not solely want to find fraud, but find pat-
terns of interest and learn about their general occurrence, which helps to refine the experts
model of fraud.
• It has never been our goal to develop an all-in-one-solution but to complement applied
approaches. We tried to classify analyzed cases roughly into three categories.
– Cases in the first category require information beyond the available data, (e.g. personal
relationships, general financial status) for detection.
– The second category contains cases that can be detected with technically straightfor-
ward threshold filters over the stream of transactions (for example implemented in
SQL).
– Fraudsters in the last group more or less successfully conceal their activities by com-
bining groups of inconspicuous transactions that disappear in the mass of similar legal
movements. The use of Chain Transactions and Smurfing was intense in this group.
For the above reasons, it is the members of the last group that we decided to focus on. It has
to be stated that we do not argue or expect that almost all internal fraud will contain transaction
chains and structuring. But we argue that it is worth examining those structures as they are
helpful means to circumvent existing fraud detection solutions.
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2.1.3 Compliance
Compliance can be defined as “acting according to certain accepted standards” . Compliance
violations according to company regulations may occur due to (possibly willful) ignorance or
negligence. Customer advisors may not follow mandatory processes, make use of a system in
other than the intended way or act uneconomically. Internal fraud can be seen as severe non-
compliant behavior with criminal intention. The detection of non-compliant behavior is therefore
related to internal fraud detection.
Without delving into the topic it turned out that our approach may have considerable potential
in this area (see section 4.3).
2.1.4 Money Laundering
One of the most prominent forms of fraud is money laundering. Countermeasures, or anti money
laundering (AML) is of particular but not exclusive interest for the financial industry. Legal reg-
ulations commit financial and non-financial institutions to identify and report suspicious money
transactions to financial intelligence units in most countries [Moll, 2009]. Legal regulations are for
example defined by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and the USA PATRIOT Act in the U.S. and by
the Swiss Anti Money Laundering Act of 1998 (SAMLA). Since 2009, the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is in charge of the governmental supervision in Switzerland. The
Financial Action Taks Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental organization founded in 1989 by the
G7 forum. The FATF currently comprises 32 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organizations,
representing most major financial centers in all parts of the globe [FATF, 2009].
Due to organizational changes during the course of this thesis, the focus on internal fraud detec-
tion was switched to certain aspects of AML, in particular the Know Your Customer (KYC) princi-
ple. The approach developed for internal fraud detection was therefore extended and adapted
to evaluate its potential in the area of AML as well (see section 4.4.1). However, in contrast to
internal fraud, we did not have the possibility to analyze the characteristics of money launder-
ing in Alphafin extensively, but relied on AML expert input. Therefore we refer to the numerous
publications available in this domain, e.g. [Altenkirch, 2006].
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2.1.5 Other Types of External Fraud
The issue of external fraud was not broached in this thesis—with the exception of a quick glance
at money laundering. Potential of the proposed solutions in detecting external fraud in Alphafin
remains future work.
2.1.6 Countermeasures
Countermeasures can have two basically different goals:
• Fraud prevention
• Fraud detection
Avoiding fraud is preferable to detecting it when it already happened, but is not always possible.
Safeguarding and keeping business processes flexible and efficient may antagonize each other.
Preventive countermeasures can be implemented at two different levels:
• Organizational
Qualified structures and competence orders can avoid or complicate illicit acts and close
organizational flaws. Training and company culture may be used to raise fraud awareness.
• Operational
measures adapt business processes and applications to hinder violations and misuse. Exten-
sive control measures come at the risk of upsetting employees and to cumber daily business.
An example is the two-person integrity for sensitive processes.
Detection requires analytical countermeasures. In [Luell, 2005], we distinguished four possible
procedures for analytical fraud detection:
• Day-to-day inspection of the total data by fraud experts
All the data is searched for conspicuous patterns which are investigated in detail. Due to
the high manpower requirements, this approach is only feasible for a very limited amount
of data and if fraud has to be detected at any cost.
• Samples are drawn from the total data and inspected.
The sample choice may be influenced by expert know-how to a certain extent, but remains
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a more or less random process. Sample size might be chosen on the basis of disposable
manpower. This approach is a possible choice if investigation of the total data is infeasible.
Its relatively undirected nature calls for more effective approaches. In particular if fraud is
extremely rare, the chance of a “lucky strike” is far too low.
• Based on concrete hints and complaints an explicit, a constricted subset of the data is in-
vestigated. A customer may notice discrepancies in asset documentation and informs the
company. A case-based investigation is the consequence. Case-based detection might be
a widespread and accurate approach, but it is, basically, “locking the stable door after the
horse has bolted”. At this point, at least reputational loss has already happened, and the
goal is damage limitation. Detecting fraud before the cheated customer realizes it is defi-
nitely preferable.
• The total data is automatically searched for potentially critical subsets which are presented
to human experts for closer investigation. Depending on the accuracy of the identification
and retrieval of critical subsets, this approach may allow for a significant improvement of
efficiency and effectiveness in comparison to the procedures mentioned above. Different
strategies for identifying adequate concepts and retrieving patterns of interest are discussed
in the section 2.3.
As expected, our approach falls into the last category of possible procedures.
2.2 Fundamentals of Data Mining
What is data mining7? This term denotes the computer-aided discovery of patterns of interest in
data bases and therewith revelation of valuable information previously hidden in the potentially
massive amount of data. Consider the data of purchases in a supermarket. Hundred thousands
of shopping baskets may be recorded every day for a large supermarket chain. Data mining algo-
rithms may search the data and find patterns like “Customers which buy red wine and French cheese
will, with very high probability, also buy baguette”or “In rural regions, female customers at the age of 40 to
7This section is intended for the reader not familiar with data mining and related topics. Others can safely skip it.
The goal is to provide a very short high level description of the concepts required to understand the assessment of related
work and the derivation of our approach decisions.
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50 can be classified as high-value customers.”Data mining is the core of the KDD-Process (Knowledge
Discovery in Databases), which is concerned with the selection, preprocessing, transformation
and mining of data, including the evaluation and interpretation of the results. Data mining is just
a tool, human (business) experts evaluating and considering the value of identified patterns is
typically indispensable. Data mining algorithms generally aim for prediction or description. Pre-
diction makes use of some attributes in the database to predict unknown or future values of other
variables of interest. Description focuses on finding human-interpretable patterns describing the
data [Fayyad et al., 1996]. At a slightly more detailed level, data mining can be divided into the
following tasks (description is based on [Fayyad et al., 1996]):
• Classification is a learning function that maps (classifies) a data item into one of several
predefined classes (e.g. the classification of a customer into “defrauded”or “not defrauded”)
• Regression is a learning function that maps a data item to a real-valued prediction variable
(e.g. the prediction of a customers lifecycle value in dollars)
• Clustering is a common descriptive task where one seeks to identify a finite set of categories
or clusters to describe the data (e.g. identifying relevant target groups of customers)
• Dependency modeling focuses on describing dependencies and associations between data
items (e.g. finding products which are commonly purchased altogether)
• Change and deviation detection focuses on discovering the most significant changes in the
data from previously measured or normative values (e.g. finding phones with uncommon
usage patterns for fraud detection)
Another crucial concept is the distinction between supervised and unsupervised methods. Su-
pervised methods learn predictive models from training examples. Training examples belong to
one of the classes used later for prediction. The attribute denoting class membership is called
target variable or label. For example, if a sufficient amount of accounts known to be defrauded
is available (and not defrauded accounts likewise) a model can be calculated which finds signifi-
cant differences (based on the available attributes) in the two classes. The model is then applied
to future data, predicting class membership (if a account may be defrauded or not). Supervised
methods require the availability of target variables (labels), which is not always given in a real
world problem. Classification and regression are typical exponents of supervised methods.
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Unsupervised methods do not require (class membership) labels and focus on a compact de-
scription of the data items. In comparison to supervised methods, they often have a more ex-
plorative character. A particular significance relating to fraud detection has deviation or outlier
detection, based on the assumption that uncommon behavior is a good indicator for fraudulent
behavior. Other methods try to identify common behavior or behavior that slightly deviates from
common one.
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2.3 Related Work
A considerable amount of research work has been published in the field of data-mining-assisted
fraud detection. Existing survey papers give an overview of publications [Maes et al., 2000; Phua
et al., 2005; Kou et al., 2004; Bolton and Hand, 2002]. However, a systematic analysis with ref-
erence to crucial differences of the approaches and their premises to be effective has never been
conducted.
In the following, we organize existing work based on the according prior knowledge level as
it provides a crucial differentiator. First, the three levels of prior knowledge are defined and
described. After this, research in all three categories is described.
Concluding, we consider the field of visualization and visual data mining in a nutshell. Com-
plementing explicit fraud detection papers, we include some research from other areas that is
relevant for the project at hand.
Fraud detection is a wide area. Specific detection problems can differ from each other in nu-
merous aspects, which, in turn, leads to a wide variety of adequate solutions. After giving an
overview of the existing research, we identify those aspects and provide a framework to support
assessments of future fraud detection problems and possible approaches based on related work.
Furthermore, we will motivate the design decisions for our approach by applying this framework
to the situation we met at Alphafin.
2.3.1 Classifying Related Work: Prior Knowledge Levels
When considering different approaches for application to a real world problem, the available
prior knowledge on fraud is a crucial factor. While in one case, fraud is known to be a problem
but otherwise a largely unknown concept, there may be extensive knowledge of revealed fraud
in another case. Basically, three levels can be identified:
No or very low prior knowledge If a business is considered under the aspect of fraud pre-
vention or detection only for a short time, knowledge based on experience is lacking. The fact
that fraud detection is considered at all suggests however that a certain amount of fraud cases
has been discovered and minimal knowledge is available. Only one paper mentions that the in-
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troduced data-mining-assisted system constitutes the initial countermeasure and therefore prior
knowledge is very limited [Major and Riedinger, 2002]. Such a system has completely different
premises than a solution which can be based upon extensive expertise. A common approach to
this problem is not to have a system identify “fraud” (as this is a widely unknown concept for
the time being) but to search for “uncommon behavior” which, of course, has to be defined in an
appropriate way. The identified behavior is subsequently delivered to human experts for closer
investigation and evaluation. This approach assumes that there is an adequate concept of “un-
common behavior” which is able to discriminate between fraudulent and normal behavior. Such
a system requires extensive efforts by a human expert, which learns the concept “fraud”while
working with the system. Ideally, the expert may feed the gained knowledge back to the system
to gradually improve its discriminative power. Typically, the number of “false positives”(false
alarms) is very high at the beginning and reduces as the human and the system refine their knowl-
edge about the mechanisms of fraud.
Existing identification knowledge (”labels”) We define identification knowledge as follows:
Identification knowledge is knowing if an instance is fraudulent or not. In this case, the data is
typically ”labelled”8 For example, phone fraud experts may know which of the calls logged in
the past are fraudulent. They may, however, not have an extensive knowledge about the mecha-
nisms and properties of the fraud cases, what we call model knowledge (see below). This situa-
tion is ideal for an approach which Fawcett and colleagues describe as “discriminating method”
[Fawcett et al., 1997]: based on known fraudulent examples a model is calculated which describes
the discriminating factors between fraudulent and normal behavior. This approach can also be
valuable in the presence of prior (human) knowledge about fraud mechanisms. Being able to
consider more data than a human expert, calculated models can display previously unknown
interrelations or can be used to support informal hypotheses. As the presence of a sufficient num-
ber of identified fraud cases (used for model calculation) typically implies a certain prior model
knowledge which lead to the discovery of those cases, this approach is assumed to offer model
knowledge refinements rather than completely new knowledge. In other words, the models are,
naturally, only calculated on the basis of previously identified examples and therefore will not
have the ability to find completely new fraud tactics. Completely new, innovative fraud brings
8E.g. there is an attribute providing the information if an instance is fraudulent or not.
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the human experts back to the “no or very low prior knowledge” situation and the appropriate
methods mentioned above.
Another crucial consideration when using calculated models is the interpretability. The active
substantiation of a suspicion (for example by interrogating the suspect) is only possible if the
investigator is able to reconstruct the reason for the initial suspicion. No suspect will be reported
without a human expert knowing why (but only based on a score based on a black-box-model).
If the calculated model is human-interpretable (e.g. a decision tree), suspicion validation can be
accomplished directly. If the model is not human interpretable (e.g. a neural network), its output
has to be validated by a human expert e.g. directly based on the data, where it is, to some extent,
replaced by a human model. Some research work appears to completely disregard this aspect.
Existing model knowledge This type of prior knowledge is more elaborate than identification
knowledge. Fraud experts may know exactly what they are looking for from experience, but
they lack the appropriate tools for an efficient and effective search. In contrast to the approach
mentioned above, the models are not calculated by an algorithm, but defined by human experts.
These models can, e.g., be intentionally fuzzy to allow for an extension of knowledge about fraud
when evaluating the results (“seeing the borders between fraud and normal behavior”), which
again points back to the “low prior knowledge setting”. An advantage of this approach is that the
model is not constrained by the model calculation method, but only by the richer expressivity of
the human brain and the mechanisms built to retrieve the patterns defined by the model. A dis-
advantage is the possible discrepancy in the identification knowledge and the model knowledge
of the human expert (e.g. because the model is too complex to be captured by a human expert —
or the amount of data is too big to consider exhaustively). Prior model knowledge motivates the
use of pattern matchers to retrieve interesting data.
2.3 Related Work 35
Another relevant categorization can be made concerning the available format of prior knowl-
edge:
• Machine readable
Machine readable identification knowledge corresponds to “labels”or “targets” in Data Min-
ing, which is a requirement for the model calculation with supervised Data Mining algo-
rithms. Machine readable model knowledge is a typical result of Data Mining and other
knowledge engineering techniques.
• Informal, not machine readable
Informal identification knowledge requires manual effort. The transfer to a machine read-
able format suggests itself, but is not always possible (as in our case). Informal model
knowledge is the typical example for human model construction, e.g. if model calculation
is infeasible or not considered valuable.
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2.3.2 Fraud Detection Based on Very Low Prior Knowledge
The detection of abusive use of a retail transaction processing system by employees is the goal
in [Kim et al., 2003b]. It is therewith one of — to our knowledge — only two academic publica-
tions concerning analytic internal fraud detection at the employee level. The authors argue that
as the retail sector often does not possess sufficient expertise about potential and actual frauds, an
anomaly detection approach to fraud has to be employed. The idea is to find temporal association
rules between transactions which are uncommon but still not extremely rare. These association
rules are then used to create detectors. Experts should then be able to decide which detectors
are valuable. Valuable detectors are then cloned and mutated to broaden the scope and make the
search more “fuzzy” . This approach is inspired by the human immune system, using positive
and negative selection [Kim et al., 2003b]. Although the vision was to build a ready-to-use prod-
uct, the project turned out to be too ambitious and stopped at the prototype level as mentioned
in the final report [Kim et al., 2003a]. However, extensive expert evaluation resources seemed to
be available, which is desirable in the case of an anomaly detection approach. Evaluation results
were not as expected as the detected and fully investigated anomalies turned out to be legal be-
havior.
A solution which is occasionally used in anti-money-laundering is the Peer Group Analysis [We-
ston et al., 2008]. The idea is to define a peer group which contains the objects most similar to
the target object. Peer groups can for instance be defined based on clustering algorithms or based
on business knowledge. The objects and peer group summaries (which describe the “average”
behavior within a peer group) are monitored over time. If an object starts to exhibit behavior
which is substantially different from the average behavior of its peer group, it is considered sus-
picious. Changes which affect the whole peer group (e.g. due to changes in the market situation)
are masked, which avoids the generation of false alerts. The authors argue that the distinguish-
ing feature of the peer group analysis lies in its focus on local patterns rather than global mod-
els. The unusualness of an object is not measured on the basis of the whole population but on
“similar”objects. The choice of an adequate similarity definition is crucial for this method. This
approach makes prominent assumptions, which are not mentioned explicitly in the publication.
In particular, the authors assume that behavior change is a valuable indicator for fraudulent be-
havior, which may not always be true. We will discuss this in greater detail when introducing
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our unifying framework in section 2.4. In a recent publication [Weston et al., 2008], an in-depth
discussion of credit card fraud detection using peer group analysis is provided.
A similar solution for the problem of low prior knowledge9 in a topic where fraud detection
has not been done before is proposed in [Major and Riedinger, 2002]. This approach makes use
of an “operations cycle” and a “development cycle” to detect fraud in health care claims. First,
a Peer Group Analysis variant is used to find health care providers which “stand out from the
mainstream”, which are then presented to a security unit. In the development cycle, rules should
be induced based on the expert analysis of the outliers. As in [Kim et al., 2003b], these rules are
proposed to be cloned and mutated. Details about the development cycle process are not given.
This system is supposed to “address a class of identification problems that are more likely to
be encountered in business than in science or engineering” and is therefore mostly application-
oriented. The question arises if outlier detection is a sensible discriminator for fraud identifica-
tion. We will get back to this issue when we discuss applicability issues below.
An alternative approach to the problem of missing identification knowledge is proposed in [Brock-
ett et al., 2002]. It is not based on outlier detection as most of the related work, but tries to achieve
a classification (or at least a fraud suspiciousness ranking) without given class labels. Instead,
experts are required to look at each attribute used for prediction and rank the corresponding at-
tribute values in terms of likelihood of suspicion. Attributes are assumed to be ordinal. Based
on this ranking, the attribute values are transferred to numerical RIDIT-Scores10 [Brockett et al.,
2002]. In contrast to the obvious solution of just assigning integers - as for example, the rank -
to the possible attribute values, RIDIT-Scores do not presuppose equal interval spacing and, in
addition, are able to reflect “abnormality”of an attribute value (which reflects the concept of en-
tropy used e.g. in decision tree algorithms). Summation of the RIDIT-Scores of each attribute
values of a given instance leads to an overall score which can be used for classification or ranking.
Apparently, this approach requires a certain amount of model knowledge from experts to do the
attribute value ranking. It could be argued that it therefore falls into the category of approaches
with given model knowledge.
9The authors Major and Riedinger use the term ”fragmentary, microlevel knowledge”.
10This term was introduced by [Bross, 1958] and denotes a scoring model for ranking attribute values according to an
underlying latent variable (in this case fraud likelihood). In contrast to the obvious solution of just assigning integers -
as for example, the rank - to the possible attribute values, RIDIT-Scores do not presuppose equal interval spacing and, in
addition, are able to reflect “abnormality”of an attribute value (which reflects the concept of entropy used e.g. in decision
tree algorithms)
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An approach based on a first-order markov chain for phone fraud detection is discussed in
[Hollme´n and Tresp, 1998]. The generative model used exists of two hidden binary variables,
representing if an account is currently victimized by a fraudster and if the fraudster in question
currently performs fraud, respectively. The observed binary variable is representing if a mobile
phone is currently being used. The experiment was started in an entirely unsupervised exper-
iment, but due to poor performance, available information which accounts were victimized by
fraud was used for parameter estimation. Further examples which make use of outlier detection
and behavior change analysis are [Yamanishi et al., 2000] and [Burge and Shawe-Taylor, 2001].
In [Xu et al., 2006], a method for monitoring behavior to detect online attacks is proposed. As in
many other approaches, a behavior profiling is followed by a behavior monitoring. This is done
on both the individual and the system level. The authors argue that system level monitoring
may help to detect system flaws which are exploited by many users (for example, obtaining game
points without playing in an online game), but may not be detected at the individual level as the
impact is too low.
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2.3.3 Fraud Detection Based on Prior Identification Knowledge
The situation of available identification knowledge maps directly to the use of supervised data
mining algorithms, which require the corresponding labels. As expected, most of the related
work meeting this initial situation makes used of supervised algorithms. In the field of man-
agement fraud, [Fanning and Cogger, 1998] makes use of a Neural Network (AutoNet) to learn
a model based on constructed training data. Informal identification knowledge in the form of
SEC Enforcement Releases11 is converted to labels for training. Entity attributes are company and
management structure descriptions —this is one of very few examples in fraud detection where
the focus does not lie on events but objects.
A considerable amount of research in the fraud detection area is based on ready-to-use data with
labeled examples. The focus lies on the design of the data-mining method, application issues are
completely ignored. In this setting, evaluation is straightforward. A common approach is the use
of multiple classification models, which are combined using meta-learning12. Phua [Phua et al.,
2004] uses this approach to detect illegitimate car insurance claims. An explicit cost model which
considers average costs of investigation and average cost per claim is used for evaluation. The
performance is measured in cost savings, which, of course, is attractive but may be infeasible for
most real world evaluations as the actual costs may be very hard to determine. Meta-learning is
also proposed to attack the problem of massive data, highly skewed data, and variable classifi-
cation costs [Chan et al., 1999; Stolfo et al., 1997; Stolfo et al., 1998]. The idea of combining local
fraud classifiers, which are calculated in different financial institutions into a global detector using
meta-learning, is introduced in [Prodromidis and Stolfo, 1999]. This should allow companies to
share knowledge about fraud without exchanging sensitive data and allow for a global detector
which “will be able to pick up patterns of fraud that are not detectable at the local level [. . . ]”.
The idea seems attractive as, e.g., in money laundering detection, the limited local views of single
financial institutions form a crucial limitation. However, it remains unclear if models which are
unspecific enough to be interchangeable without giving away sensitive data can be combined to a
more expressive meta-classifier. In particular, without revealing customer information, activities
of a person in different financial institutions cannot be mapped to each other. Another issue are
11U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Releases, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml
12Meta-learning denotes the learning on the basis of results from previously applied learners. An extensive survey can
be found in [Vilalta et al., 2004].
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differences in schema definitions of the databases, which lead to incompatible classifiers. [Prodro-
midis and Stolfo, 1999] describes a technique called “bridging”to overcome this problem, which
basically is a combination of well-known data preprocessing steps. This approach is reported
to be successful in an experimental setup using credit card fraud data across two participating
banks.
[Maes et al., 1993] is an example of straightforward application of existing data mining algorithms
to an “ideal” data set: it uses Bayesian and neural networks for credit card fraud detection data.
Unfortunately, details about the used features are not given. Bayesian Networks Models are used
in [Ezawa and Norton, 1995] to predict uncollectible debt.
No success using standard machine learning techniques is reported in [Fawcett et al., 1997]
and [Fawcett and Provost, 1996] for phone cloning fraud detection. Two problems are identi-
fied: First, a call that is unusual for one customer can be typical for another customer. Context
information to account for this fact is not directly available in this case, so it is derived from his-
torical data specific to each account. This leads to the detection of changes in behavior rather
than absolute indicators of fraud. Second, fraud identification on the basis of individual calls is
assumed to produce an unacceptable true positive/false positive ratio. The single event perspec-
tive is therefore switched to an aggregated event or single object perspective, “smoothing out the
variation and watching for coarser-grained changes that have better predictive power”. The pro-
posed approach generates fraud rules based on each separate account using a beam search. In a
rule selection step, the most general rules are selected. These general rules are then turned into
account specific profiling monitors, that is, the rules are customized to each account. If a monitor
registers deviation from the modeled normal behavior, it will generate an alert. In a final step,
evidence from the monitors is then combined to an overall score. Evidence combination weights
and the threshold above which an alarm should be issued is learned using a standard learning
algorithm. This approach is similar to the peer group analysis [Weston et al., 2008] in two aspects:
it also makes use of local instead of global models and searches for behavior changes.
Cahill et al [Cahill et al., 2002] extend this approach by changing the focus from a time-driven (ac-
count summaries on a daily basis) to a event-driven model, weighting recent calls more heavily
and by using adaptive, updatable user profiles they call “account signatures”. Account signatures
are based on estimations for multivariate probability distributions, describing which call features
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are likely for the account, and which are not. The authors state that “fraud typically results in
unusual account activity”, this probability is the “right background to judge fraud against”. In
addition to the account signature, a “fraud signature” is used, which requires labeled data.
A more general view on the field of activity monitoring and corresponding evaluation issues is
given in [Fawcett and Provost, 1999].
A completely different approach is used in [Burge and Shawe-Taylor, 2001]. An expert system
using simple fuzzy logic based rules is proposed. The fuzzy rules account for subjective nature
and therefore with the ambiguity of the parameters. The system is designed for insurance claim
detection but is only tested on hypothetical data.
The recent survey of data mining-based financial fraud detection research [Yue et al., 2007] re-
ports that the large part of publications relies on supervised methods as regression and neural
networks. This is not surprising as the use of available labeled data is very convenient for readily
generating research results and publications.
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2.3.4 Excursus: Relation Based Approaches
So far we have seen that the large part of analytical fraud detection research is based on the analy-
sis of single events or objects. This seems to be true for very recent publications as well, although
fundamentals of relation based mining and pattern matching topics are actively researched today.
The reason for this may lie in the nature of available data for fraud detection research. For in-
stance, when analysing phone calls or credit card transactions, a large part of the relevant network
may lie beyond company borders and is therefore not available13. However, methods concern-
ing object or event relations seem to be more present in other adversarial domains as anti-money
laundering or terrorist detection [Phua et al., 2005]. Of course, the application of relation based
methods requires the data to be of relational nature, that is, consist of events (as phone calls or
transactions) and objects (as accounts or mobile phones). Most data used in related work satisfies
this precondition. Typcial exceptions are financial statement or insurance fraud.
Consequently, the related work discussed in this section is not limited to fraud detection research,
but relation based mining and pattern matching in general. Mining relationship network data
which typically can be represented as a graph is an relatively new research topic. Numerous
terms and concepts recently emerged which are often not easy to differentiate. One survey paper
[Washio and Motoda, 2003] for example proposes that “graph data mining is more geometry ori-
ented and relational data mining is more logic and relation oriented”, while another [Chakrabarti
and Faloutsos, 2006] states that “relational learning typically focuses on finding small structures/-
patterns at the local level, while graph mining looks far more at the global structure”. A great deal
of similarities exist between the work in link analysis, hypertext and web mining, relational learn-
ing, inductive logic programming and graph mining. The excellent survey by L. Getoor and C.
Diehl [Getoor and Diehl, 2005] introduces the term link mining as the intersection of these re-
search areas and identifies eight link mining tasks in respect to their focus on objects, links or
whole graphs (See table 2.2). We will stick with this terms when discussing example approaches.
One of the most prominent tasks in link mining is the subgraph discovery problem of finding
frequent patterns in graphs. The idea is easily understandable: given a graph, find common sub-
structures which repeatedly occur on a local level. An intuitive application is the identification
13We met the same problem in a cross-selling analysis performed for a telecommunication company [Weiss, 2006],
where relation based approaches turned out to be inappropriate.
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Object Related Tasks Link-Based Object Ranking
Link-Based Object Classification
Object Clustering (Group Detection)
Object Identification (Entity Resolution)
Link Related Tasks Link Prediction
Graph Related Tasks Subgraph Discovery
Graph Classification
Generative Models for Graphs
Table 2.2: Link Mining tasks
of common atom/bond structures in molecules. Subdue was one of the first frameworks tack-
ling this problem and has been constantly extended [Holder et al., 1994; Cook and Holder, 2000;
Ketkar, 2005]. It identifies the subgraphs which best compress a graph in terms of the minimum
description length principle14 and replaces the corresponding instances with a placeholder node,
hereby compressing the graph. The algorithm is then applied again to the compressed graph iter-
atively which allows for finding common subgraphs consisting of previously identified common
patterns. Iterative application on the increasingly compressed input graph can also be used for
graph-based hierarchical clustering [Jonyer et al., 2000], resulting in a clustering tree of nested
substructures. Domain knowledge can be used to influence the scoring of the patterns for rout-
ing the search process to a certain extent. A match cost function can be used to bring in inexact
matching.
The counterpart of the common substructure finding task is the mining for structural anoma-
lies, which has been recently done in Subdue [Eberle and Holder, 2007]. Anomalies are seen as
modifications, insertions or deletions on common substructures. For this purpose, the algorithm
searches for structures which are similar to common substructures, however dissimilar enough to
appear to be (or more precisely, to contain) an anomaly in the above sense. The authors state that
their definition of an anomaly is different from most approaches which are looking for unusual or
“bad”patterns. As e.g. money launderers try to imitate legal transaction patterns, this approach
could have potential in anti-money laundering and possibly in fraud detection, which is contem-
plated, but not evaluated in the paper . However, the introduced approach presumes a number
of eminent assumptions, e.g. that the majority of the input graph consists of a common pattern
and anomalies do not deviate more than a fixed threshold from this pattern. Furthermore, the
14for extensive information on the minimum description length principle, see e.g. http://www.mdl-research.org/
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graph is assumed to be “regular” however, it remains unclear what the authors exact definition
of a regular graph is.
In the second one of the two internal fraud detection papers at employee level known to us [Eberle
and Holder, 2009], the authors use graph based anomaly detection for the detection of insider
threats in business transactions and processes. Anomalous instances of structural patterns are
discovered in data that represent entities, relationships and actions. The authors assume again
that the majority of the analyzed graph consists of a normative pattern and only limited modifi-
cations are done in the case of an anomaly that is, anomalies are similar to the normative pattern.
Supervised graph classification is also done with the aid of Subdue [Holder et al., 1994]: Given
a training set of positive and negative graphs15, structures are searched which are common in the
positive graphs, but not common in the negative graphs, therefore building discriminative struc-
tures between the two classes.
A stronger focus on context-induced interestingness for frequent pattern mining is proposed in
[Berendt, 2005]. The author introduces a taxonomy on the graph by simply adding more gen-
eral terms to the nodes of the graph (e.g. “animal”instead of “bird”). Frequent patterns are then
mined using the general terms and called “abstract patterns”. However, the algorithm not just
returns the abstract patterns, but also the “individual patterns”constituting them (on the “bird
level”). It therefore delivery “abstract pattern-frequent individual patterns”which are supposed
to be of interest.
Another publication [Zaki et al., 2004] proposes a whole system for frequent pattern mining for
massive data sets including a storage and persistency manager. This is a good example for ap-
proaches which may have a very good scalability and performance but are infeasible for research
under constrained real world conditions as the installation of whole new systems is often not al-
lowed. [Washio and Motoda, 2003] gives an extensive overview on other frequent pattern mining
approaches, categorizing them into greedy search based, ILP16 based, inductive DB based, graph
theory based and support vector based methods. In crime related topics, link based object rank-
ing and classification is more common than frequent pattern mining. A prominent example is
the suspicion scoring based on guilt-by-association as described in [Macskassy and Provost, 2005].
Suspicion scores of nodes in the network are estimated by counting malicious associates. As the
15In this case, whole graph are labeled as positive or negative.
16Inductive Logic Programming
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scores of the individual nodes influence each other (i.e., their neighbors), the scoring algorithm
is not “finished”after the first pass, but can be called iteratively on the node scores changed in
the previous pass. Scores are propagated through the network until all suspicion scores stabilize.
Convergence is enforced by using a simulated annealing to avoid oscillation between different end-
states. This approach is based on the relaxation labeling algorithm introduced in [Chakrabarti
et al., 1998], where it is used to categorize hypertext using link information. In their paper in-
troducing communities of interest [Cortes et al., 2001], the authors point out the problem of record
linkage. For example, if a fraudulent account is detected and closed, it is possible that the fraud-
ster will use another account under a different assumed identity. The goal is to find subgraphs
with a significant overlap to the behavior of the previously identified “fraudulent subgraph”to
reveal the fraudster behind the assumed identity.
Another straightforward method for link-based object classification is described in [Bernstein
et al., 2003; Bernstein et al., 2002]. The approach is based on two different types of vectors: Entity
vectors represent entities in respect to their strengths of relationship to some defined background
entities (e.g., nodes with known labels). Class vectors represent classes in respect to the strength
of relationship between the class and the background entities. Entity vectors and class vectors
can be combined for building a scoring which is used for classification of ranking. As in guilt-by-
association [Macskassy and Provost, 2005], this approach assumes that the interlinkage between
class members is strong enough to build a good classifier solely based on linkage information.
Another link analysis approach which may be of special interest for fraud and crime detection
are center-piece subgraphs [Tong and Faloutsos, 2006]. The center-piece subgraph problem is based
on a set of query nodes Q, which are generally speaking nodes of special interest. The task is to
find a subgraph with strong connections to all or most of the nodes in Q. This is done by using a
random walk strategy starting a the query nodes, identifying good “connection” nodes between
query nodes. The approach exhibits similarities to TMatch, which is one of the approaches we
propose for the detection component. The main difference is that the center-piece subgraphs
approach is more focused on identifying ”centerpieces” (central nodes) while TMatch also does
identify central nodes, but is more focused on the structure and relations between all nodes in a
subgraph of interest. Most work in link-mining is focused on static graphs and completely ignores
the time dimension. However, in many real world graphs, weights between nodes are often not
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static but changing with time, forming a time series [Jin et al., 2007]. One possibility to account
for changes over time is to identify trends in time series of graph elements and then mining for
common substructures in the graph relating to trends. The authors of the Trend Motif approach
[Jin et al., 2007] assume given weights for vertices which change over time. Maximal consistent
(increasing/ decreasing) trend intervals are identified. During an identified trend interval, the
corresponding node is assigned a node label indicating the trends direction (“+”or “-”). A fre-
quent pattern mining based on the graph with these dynamically labeled nodes leads to common
subgraphs which occur in limited time intervals (Trend Motifs). Figure 2.3 shows an example
of identified motif occurrences, displaying for example opposing trends in global market share
between the USA and Mexico, Argentina and South Africa (b).
Figure 2.3: Trend Motif examples from [Jin et al., 2007]
We assume that extending this approach to allow for trend labels for edges instead of nodes could
lead to more expressive patterns and a more fine-grained analysis which may be of use in anti-
money laundering and fraud detection.
[O’Madadhain et al., 2005] focuses on predicting future event co-participation of entities (link
prediction) and the change in importance of nodes over time. Link prediction is done by embed-
ding the local graph structure and covariates in a fixed-dimensional feature space, allowing to
use standard probabilistic classifiers on the binary label “co-participating”, “not co-participating”.
The model is learned on historic data and applied to recent data. The event-based ranking is done
by initializing each node with an equal amount of potential and propagating some potential from
nodes not participating in an event to nodes participating in events at each time step. This leads
to a higher potential and therefore higher importance for nodes which often participate in events
over time.
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A completely different link mining problem considering the time dimension is described in
[Kubica et al., 2003]. Initial situation is a noisy graph, the goal is to find the “true” underlying
structure. A random walk model is used for link generation, weighted counts of co-occurrences
are then used to approximate the “real”link weights. A temporal weighting determines to which
extent older links are counted a relevant. Weighting can also depend on the type of a link, allow-
ing for link types which are more significant for the underlying structure than other link types.
This approach could possibly lead to more coherent results than just omitting weak links when
trying to find the constituting structure of a graph. The application in anti-money laundering
analysis could therefore be of use.
Link Analysis is a huge and very active research area. Surveys as [Pottenger et al., 2006] give
an overview of recent approaches and solutions.
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2.3.5 Fraud Detection Based on Prior Model Knowledge
The existence of prior model knowledge reduces fraud detection to a retrieval problem of known
patterns. Depending on the complexity of patterns of interest, approaches may make use of
straightforward SQL-Queries, rules in a knowledge base, or graph pattern matching algorithms.
Of course, those methods may be combined with other approaches which try to complement and
refine the model knowledge. It is worth noting that in spite of a strong focus on (supervised) data
mining approaches in purely academic experiments, applied research often relies on prior model
knowledge, as can be seen in the following section. After introducing the field of relation based
approaches in Link Analysis, we will stick with the focus on the relational prespective in this
section, that is, on graph pattern matching algorithms. We first introduce a number of existing
detection systems making use of graph pattern matching and subsequently look at the problem
of graph pattern matching in slightly more detail.
Pattern Matching Fraud Detection Systems
The NASD Regulation Detection System (ADS) [Kirkland et al., 1998; Kirkland et al., 1999; Sena-
tor, 2000], the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network AI System (FAIS) [Goldberg and Senator, 1995;
Senator et al., 1995; Kirkland et al., 1998] and the Link Analysis Workbench (LAW) [Wolverton et al.,
2003; Berry et al., 2004] are systems which are reported to make use of pattern matching algo-
rithms. ADS is built for monitoring trades and quotations in the Nasdaq stock market to identify
patterns and practices of behavior of potential regulatory interest. It combines detection (pattern
matching) and discovery (data mining) components and visualizes the results in various ways.
Discovery is done by means of parallel association rule and decision tree implementations. How-
ever, details about the way those algorithms are used are not given. Pattern matching algorithms
are available for both temporal sequences and defined rules. The sequence matcher works, like
a regular expression matcher, with state machines. Users can specify patterns using a temporal
sequence pattern editor. The rule matcher produces so-called “breaks”based on the “detection of
repeated instances of predefined behavior”represented as rules. It is mentioned that the patterns
are represented as conjunction tests on attributes and trees are created containing the pattern
conjunctions with the number of times that a conjunction is detected. Tree traversal based on
attributes tests is then used to match the pattern. Publications on the ADS are not focused on
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the details of the pattern matching approaches, but on the whole system and its embedding in
the regulatory processes. The system contains extensive management components administered
by extensive human manpower. A knowledge management board presides over domain teams
which discuss alerts and pattern configurations in weekly meetings with a KDD17 specialist. A
KDD team documents patterns and the related scenarios. Visualizations and pattern generation
editors are not discussed at length in the publications, but it appears that their complexity re-
quires elaborate training for users. This points out that a detection system in this order of magnitude
in productive use constitutionally focuses on the knowledge engineering and not on the sophistication of
algorithms, which agrees with our observations.
The FAIS System is a money laundering detection solution. Input data is a collection of large
cash transaction reports made to the U.S Treasury Departement according to terms of the Bank
Secrecy Act . One of the major tasks of the system is to link transaction reports to a distinct indi-
vidual in the presence of errors, uncertainties and inconsistencies in the data. This consolidation
step seems to rely initially on common identification information (for example, social security
number or drivers license number). A more elaborate approach of consolidation is described in
the related paper [Goldberg and Senator, 1995].
The system is used in two different modes. The user-driven mode allows for ad-hoc queries,
while the data-driven mode is used to display subjects or accounts which show relatively high
suspicion scores based on predefined rules. Link analysis in FAIS seems to be mainly a human-
powered approach based on visualizations, which is a form of visual data mining.
The LAW system, which is also in productive use, is built for detecting terrorist and other crim-
inal activity. The authors point out three possible approaches for this problem: the matching of
known patterns of interest, the identification of anomalies where (legal) patterns are violated, and
the discovery of new patterns of interest. LAW relies on the pattern matching approach, which is
not a trivial problem, as the authors argue. Inexact pattern matching is provided as a pattern is
defined as a prototype of a situation with allowable deviations. Patterns representations are based
on graphs, and inexact matching is based on topological edit distance and ontological distance as
an ontology of occurring concepts is available. Pattern specifications can be nested. The matching
algorithm is based on A*-Search where a state in the search is a partial match and the cost is the
17KDD means ”Knowledge Discovery in Databases” — put simply, a data mining specialist.
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sum of the delete costs for yet unmatched nodes and links, and replacement cost of the current
node and link mappings. For the expert evaluation of the found structures, this system also relies
on visualization. The authors argue that this approach should not be pursued at the exclusion of
others and therefore does not claim to solve all detection problems in this domain. Matching in
the time dimension seems not to be regarded in the LAW system.
CrimeNet Explorer [Xu and Chen, 2005] is a system using social network analysis and visualiza-
tion in combination with hierarchical clustering to assist identification of subgroups in criminal
networks, however not accounting for the time dimension. The focus on subgroups in crimi-
nal networks suggests that this approach makes use of prior model knowledge while having an
explorative character.
Graph Pattern Matching
In the following, we will focus on graph pattern matching approaches which are of special interest
for the project at hand as the data can be seen as a multigraph G(V,E) where V is the set of ac-
counts (or customers, respectively) and E is the set of financial transactions. Graph based pattern
matching has received considerable attention recently, in particular in the scope of next genera-
tion databases dealing with XML, Web, network directories, and structured documents, which
often model the data as trees and graphs [Shasha et al., 2002]. It has applications in numerous ar-
eas as computer vision, biology, electronics, computer aided design, social networks, intelligence
analysis and more. As extensive survey material of this very broad field exists [Shasha et al., 2002;
Gallagher, 2006a; Gallagher, 2006b], we focus on a general overview and point out aspects which
are of special interest in the context of our problem setting. A definition of the graph pattern
matching problem and possible variations is given in [Gallagher, 2006a]. Graph pattern matching
accordingly builds upon two elements:
1. A data graph G = (N,E), where N is the set of vertices and E the set of edges in the graph
and e ∈ E is a pair (ni, nj) where ni, nj ∈ N . The vertices and/or edges of G may be typed
and/or attributed.
2. A pattern graph or pattern query P = (NP , EP ) which specifies the structural and semantic
requirements that a subgraph of G must satisfy in order to match the pattern P . A graph G′
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is defined as a subgraph of G if and only if N ′ ⊂ N and E′ ⊂ E).
The task is to find the the set M of subgraphs of G that match the pattern P , where the notion
of a “match”varies in different approaches. Variations are identified in the following dimensions:
1. Graph properties
Basic graph properties are directed or undirected edges, weighted or unweighted edges ,
single or multiple edges between nodes and the existence of self-loops. Nodes and edges
may be typed and have attributes. (A special case of typed graphs are semantic graphs.
In semantic graphs, vertices represent concepts and edges represent relationships between
concepts. Semantic graphs are based on an ontology which specifies the possible concepts,
the relationships allowed between each pair of concepts and the attributes associated with
each concept and relationship.)
2. Matching type (structural vs. semantic)
A matching approach may only take structural properties into account (e.g., matches only
on structural similarity). The inclusion of information about node and edge types and at-
tributes leads to a often more application oriented approach.
3. Matching strictness (exact vs. inexact)
A matching approach may only return matches which are in exact accordance with P . In-
exact pattern matchers in contrast allow for differences between P and its matches to a
defined extent for example to facilitate the matching in the presence of noise. For specific
applications, matches which are similar to a defined query pattern may be of interest and
exact pattern matches may be extremely improbable. This is also true for our setting. Some
approaches allow for only partially defined and therefore imprecise query patterns (e.g.
containing wildcards).
4. Optimality
As for all search strategies, solutions may be optimal or approximate. While optimal searches
are guaranteed to find a correct match (if it exists) with an exponential worst-case com-
plexity, approximate approaches omit this warranty in trade for a lower complexity (often
polynomial).
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Gallagher [Gallagher, 2006a] additionally differentiates between single-graph (one large graph)
and graph-transaction settings ( denoting a set of relatively small graphs or, more precisely, graph
components) as introduced in [Kuramochi and Karypis, 2005].
The basis of numerous approaches and extensions in graph pattern matching is the subgraph
isomorphism algorithm introduced by Ullmann [Ullmann, 1976]. It enumerates all possible map-
pings of vertices in the pattern graph to vertices in the data graph using a depth-first tree-search
algorithm. Each path from root to leaf in the search tree represents a complete mapping of P in
G. Any such mapping that preserves adjacency in P and G (vertices that are neighbors in P map
to vertices that are neighbors in G) represents an isomorphism from P to a subgraph of G.
The problem of subgraph isomorphism is known to be NP-complete [Washio and Motoda, 2003].
In large graphs, search space reduction is therefore crucial. A common strategy is known as can-
didate selection, where unpromising portions of the data are filtered out in a preprocessing step
and the matching is done on the reduced graph. Candidate selection is typically based on cal-
culated metadata which summarizes graph properties. Examples of such summary information
are graph invariants. Graph invariants are e.g. computed based on vertex degrees [McKay, 1990]
or on paths in the graph [Giugno and Shasha, 2002]. Two identical graphs will have the same
invariants, the converse is not necessarily true. Comparisons between invariant values of data
and pattern graphs can therefore be used to prune impossible solutions from the search space.
Metadata can also be used to guide the searching process, e.g. based on selectivity estimates on
partial pattern matches. In his survey, Gallagher [Gallagher, 2006a] states that effective candidate
selection in semantic graphs is possible without generating graph invariants since they already
contain rich data on which to filter potential matches.
GraphGrep is a semantic matching approach using path-based meta information for candidate se-
lection, TMODS [Greenblatt et al., 2005; Coffman et al., 2004], and TRAKS [Aleman-Meza et al.,
2005] are other semantic matching approaches, to name prominent examples. [Tong et al., 2007] is
an example of a recent graph pattern matching approach for inexact best-effort matches. It allows
indirect paths between nodes in G which are adjacent in P . The proposed method finds patterns
in linear time on the size of the data graph. The algorithm makes use of candidate selection (called
“seed-finder”), and expanding step which tries to find an adjacent, “good”matching node and a
“bridge”function which tries to find a “good”path to connect two matching data nodes if they are
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required to be connected according to the pattern graph. The algorithm assumes a single-edge
setting an requires the graph to be represented as n× n node-to-node matrix.
To our knowledge , research on pattern matching approaches is highly biased towards un-
weighted single-edge graphs, where the existence of a relation between two nodes is a binary
decision. We identified two requirements resulting from our business considerations which are
typically ignored in the proposed approaches:
• Matching in multigraphs with a time dimension
The LAW system mentioned above is one of the very few works which combine sequential
and graph pattern matching. The search for patterns with defined properties on both the
network and the timeline dimension (which can be seen as multigraph edges with a times-
tamp attribute) is an neglected perspective. Pattern matching approaches which incorporate
node and edge attributes typically emerged from the conceptual graph research area, where
time sequences play an inferior role.
• Matching based on relations between edge and/or attribute values
The value of an edge may be of interest only in the context of other edge values, e.g. in
graphs representing monetary transactions or phone calls. For example, a person A calling
a person B at time t, which then calls 5 other persons later may be a pattern of interest for
an anti-terrorism investigator only if all those calls happen very shortly after each other.
The reviewed matching approaches, while allowing for inexact matches, require specific
attribute values (which, of course, can be concepts). Pattern graphs where node or edge
specifications depend on related attribute values in the graph18 seems to have received very
little attention, if any.
Furthermore, [Gallagher, 2006a] points out that most work is evaluated only on relatively small,
synthetic graphs which are either completely random or regular. Performance on real world data
is often not evaluated. Also, numerous approaches are built for very small individual graphs
(where “individual graph”stands for graph components). Analyzing real world financial transac-
tion graphs, we found that component size may range from very small to huge component sizes
depending on transaction types of interest, customer segments and more. Additionally, existing
18For example, a pattern based on concrete attribute values may specify that one node in the pattern has the attribute
value “5” and its direct successor has attribute value “7”, while a pattern based on attribute value relations may specify
that a node in the pattern has an attribute value that is “half the size of its successors attribute value”.
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candidate selection and indexing strategies are focused on graph structure and not on the combi-
nation of attributes, type and structure, which is assumed to have further optimization potential
[Gallagher, 2006a].
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2.3.6 Visual Data Mining
Visual Data Mining is another huge research area and is occasionally used in fraud detection. An
example for the visual exploration of atypical behavior in financial time series data using two-
dimensional colormaps is given in [Ziegler et al., 2007]. The colormaps encode growth rates of
assets for all possible combinations of time of purchase and time of sale in a single figure. In
comparison to traditional line charts, this approach simplifies the identification of “against-the-
market”behavior, underperforming assets and similar. It is imaginable that this technique may
also be valuable in fraud detection.
In the recent publication [Huang et al., 2009], a visualization approach is proposed for fraud
detection in the stock market. The authors point out that most of visualization based systems
do not consider the “analysis of related social networks”and that there has been little research
into understanding how fraud detection systems can be designed to assist the cognitive process
of the human analyst. A combination of 3D-treemaps for visualization of current stock prices,
market capitalization and changing direction is proposed for a first stage, a second stage makes
use of a network visualization in combination with pattern matching based on historical data.
This is another example of a system using the frequent combination of model knowledge with
visualization. It is not stated if the system has actually been implemented and tested on real data.
However, practical issues are not considered in the publication at all, although stated prerequi-
sites are extensive, for example the collection of patterns from past cases, which already turned
out to be infeasible in our case.
WireVis [Chang et al., 2008] is another complex system providing numerous visualization options
for the visual analysis of financial wire transactions. The authors report that expert evaluators
were not able to use the system because of security-related hardware and software restrictions
that made installation impossible so far. This again demonstrates the importance of accounting
for practical limitations.
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Figure 2.4: WireVis screenshot from [Chang et al., 2008]
2.4 Fraud Detection Approaches — A Unifying Framework
While evaluating the applicability of existing work for the situation at hand, we repeatedly found
that considerable assumptions concerning the basic conditions were made, but typically not ex-
plicitly stated. In the following, we try to identify critical factors that have to be considered to find
a feasible and appropriate solution to a specific fraud detection problem. We describe the iden-
tified factors with some considerations and combine them in a decision supporting framework.
After this, we apply the framework to our situation.
We propose three factor types:
• Company factors
form the situation given by the company, its properties and employees. Identified company
factors are
– Prior Knowledge
– Data Accessibility
– IT Landscape
– Computational Resources
– Expertise Level
– Evaluation/Refinement Resources
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• Fraud factors
originate from the fraud type and its properties. We propose the following factors:
– Visibility level
– Change level
– Volatility level
• Population factors
are based on the monitored population and its properties:
– Inter object heterogeneity level
– Intra object heterogeneity level
Note that the proposed framework is not supposed to be exhaustive, but addresses the main
issues we found to be of importance when designing our approach.
2.4.1 Basic Preconditions
A number of conditions are mandatory for the successful application of analytic fraud detection
approaches. If they are given can be a matter of assumption. We identified the following precon-
ditions:
• A minimum of machine-readable data representing relevant information is available. For illustra-
tion, log files of phone calls are a good starting point, while art forgery or marriage fraud
may not leave any relevant machine readable data.
• Fraud leaves a minimum amount of traces in the available data. Traces are at least strong enough
to distinguish a subset where the probability of fraud is reasonably higher than in the base
population.
• The introduction or extension of a fraud detection solution is economically advantageous. Losses
(e.g. monetary and reputational) which can be avoided must be in due proportion to the
costs of the system, including its usage and maintenance. However, quantification of this
ratio may be very hard or virtually impossible while being a required basis for decision-
making.
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2.4.2 Company Factors
Prior Knowledge
As mentioned above, the level of prior knowledge is a crucial design factor. In the case of a
low level of prior knowledge, unsupervised, explorative approaches can be used to find poten-
tially interesting (say e.g. uncommon) patterns. Those patterns can support the constitution of
model knowledge when evaluated by human experts. Examples are [Kim et al., 2003b; Weston
et al., 2008; Major and Riedinger, 2002; Brockett et al., 2002; Hollme´n and Tresp, 1998]. If (formal)
identification knowledge is available, supervised data mining approaches such as [Fanning and
Cogger, 1998; Phua et al., 2004; Chan et al., 1999] can be used to calculate a model. In the case
of informal identification knowledge, a conversion into a machine readable format has to be con-
sidered, but may not always be feasible depending on the nature of the information. Extensive
informal identification knowledge can possibly be condensed and converted directly into model
knowledge . As mentioned above, prior model knowledge motivates the retrieval of patterns
which are known to be of interest [Kirkland et al., 1998; Wolverton et al., 2003].
Data Accessibility
While considerations on this factor are irrelevant for purely academic experiments, it is crucial if
the solution should actually be of use in industry. An extreme case, which is nevertheless com-
mon for commercial vendors, is that the developers of a fraud detection system have no access to
the data the system is intended to work with. This situation may complicate the development of
a tailored solution in general and motivate approaches which can be seen as “configurable black-
boxes”. The design of the algorithms in the blackbox is not influenced by the specific situation at
hand — only configuration is tailored. This may limit the consideration of individual conditions.
However, we did not examine this issue in detail during the project at hand.
Of course, the amount and quality of available data is always an issue when doing data mining
and related tasks. Special attention should be given to possible discrepancies between the data
available to the detection solution and the information available to investigators. This discrep-
ancy may be based on access regulations or on the lack of machine readable representation of the
information. For example, in our case, extensive data describing accounts and transactions was
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available, but free text information describing the customer relationship history was out of scope
in spite of its importance for the evaluation of suspiciousness. The bigger this difference is, the
less it can be the goal to find actual fraud cases, but to find patterns which are relevant for human
experts. This may have some impact on design decisions.
IT Landscape
Constraints may exist that make a wide range of possible approaches infeasible or at least not
directly applicable (for example [Chang et al., 2008]). A major topic is the reformatting of data,
which is often required (e.g. [Holder et al., 1994]), but may be prohibited by company regulations,
in particular for highly sensitive data. Some approaches are based on changes or extensions at
the database system or even hardware level which may be impossible in an existing IT landscape.
Only specified programming languages, or even only parts of a programming language may be
allowed to implement the system.
Computational Resources
Computational resources can be a significant cost factor within the internal billing system of a
company. Therefore, computational capacity may be limited. The complexity of analysis has to
conform to the amount of data and the available resources.
Expertise Level
Generally speaking, approaches which are fully comprehensible for the users have a higher chance
to be accepted, as intuitive work with the system is possible. For example, a fully-fledged deci-
sion tree may be meaningful for a technically interested user, but out of the question for others.
As user acceptance is a critical success factor, the complexity of the system has to be in line with
its users.
Evaluation/Refinement Resources
Several approaches envision refinement cycles where a human expert evaluates patterns returned
by the system and feeds back findings into the system for refinement [Kim et al., 2003b], [Major
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and Riedinger, 2002],[Senator, 2000]. This requires considerable effort from investigators which
is a substantial cost factor, if disposable at all. Depending on the importance that is attached to
the project on the part of industry partner management, disposable resources may be low. This
may be the case in particular at early stages of a research project. In the case of low prior knowl-
edge, extensive evaluation (and therefore learning) effort is indispensable, but tends to be more
laborious than evaluation results based on model knowledge as the scope of returned patterns
may be broader. Generally speaking, the lower the evaluation and refinement resources are, the
more precisely should the notion of “fraud” be specified for a detection system to be successful.
However, this, in turn, increases the risk of defining “fraud” too narrowly and producing false
negatives.
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2.4.3 Fraud factors
Visibility Level
Depending on its type and the used view on the data, fraud can be evident or invisible. We can
differentiate between three levels of granularity — the single event level, the aggregated event (or
single object) level and the relation level .
On a single event level, isolated instances are monitored (e.g. [Major and Riedinger, 2002]). An
example is the monitoring for transactions which exceed a certain threshold. This assumes that a
single event contains sufficient evidence. Limitations of this level are events which are part of a
fraudulent behavior, but do not differ from normal transactions without the context of preceding
and following transactions (e.g. when smurfing is used).
While a single object level is also common, it typically contains aggregated event level attributes
[Fawcett et al., 1997] [Fawcett and Provost, 1996], e.g. in the case of financial transactions or phone
calls, why we define it as a different granularity level. The aggregated event level omits the focus
on single events by aggregating them over a certain time period. An example are daily or weekly
account summaries. Given an adequate time window for the aggregation, suspicious activities
like smurfing can be captured using aggregation. However, it increases the risk of masking in-
terspersed fraudulent events which do not have sufficient impact on the aggregated values and
vanish in the information loss of aggregation. We have met cases where employees interspersed
inconspicuous transactions over a long period of time, remaining invisible in the high and vary-
ing transaction activity of the victims. The authors of [Whitrow et al., 2009] analyze the strategy
of transaction aggregation in credit card fraud detection in detail.
In the relation level, events are analyzed in relation to other events and objects. We distinguish
two dimensions:
• Network relations
• Time relations
The approaches in the link mining and graph pattern matching area work with this granularity
level (e.g. [Holder et al., 1994; Berendt, 2005]). The high expressivity of the relation level may
lead to the view that it is generally preferable to “lower” levels. However, it has to be considered
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that results produced by relation based approaches tend to be demanding to evaluate and the
approaches are limited by the fact that only part of the whole network may be available to the
detection system. Consider a small financial institution which has only access to its own data
while e.g. a money launderer has access to the whole financial system worldwide. In addition, the
nature of the data may not be appropriate for a relational perspective as it cannot be represented
as a graph.
Change Level
Reviewing the variety of proposed detection approaches in literature, we can clearly identify two
different implicit assumptions:
• Changing behavior is a good discriminator for the detection of fraud
• Absolute indicators19 are good discriminators for the detection of fraud
We can find an illustrative example to explain the difference in the area of mobile phone fraud.
Consider a mobile phone which has been (legally) used for years and is cloned by a fraudster at
time t. Lets assume the fraudster expects the account to be detected as defrauded and closed after
a certain period of time (e.g. when the true owner is checking the monthly bill). In consequence,
he/she will try to get as much as possible out of the account. In this situation, we can reasonably
assume that the superimposed calls will lead to a significant change in behavior of the defrauded
account (as for example done in [Weston et al., 2008]) and according approaches allow for detec-
tion at an early stage. Similar situations are imaginable in credit card fraud.
However, consider a fraudster which is not mainly interested in monetary profit from a cloned
phone, but in masking his identity using a stolen phone number. A more subtle interspersion of
fraudulent calls may not lead to a significant change in behavior. Another issue is phone sub-
scription fraud where the fraudulent calls are present from the beginning (and possibly even
exclusive). In those situations, absolute fraud indicators may be of higher value as for example
applied in [Brockett et al., 2002].
Therefore, detection approaches based on behavior changes may be more adequate for fraud cases
where the detection has relatively little consequences for the perpetrator (e.g. exclusion of using
19Indicators that do not track changes in behavior, but absolute attributes of an instance, e.g. ”turnover at time t”.
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the defrauded resources without being identified), while absolute fraud indicators may be a bet-
ter choice for detecting more cautiously conducted fraud.
Similar considerations can also be done in other fraud types and related topics as e.g. anti-money-
laundering.
We challenge the general statement given in [Burge and Shawe-Taylor, 2001] that one of the most
common indicators of fraud is a significant change in behavior. We rather propose to examine this
assumption critically depending on the type of fraud and the possible motivation of the fraudster.
Volatility Level
Fraud volatility denotes how agile fraud reacts to changing circumstances (such as the introduc-
tion of an effective fraud detection system). A high volatility may correlate with high profes-
sionalism and high profit fraud. Developing new fraud schemes can be seen as a creative process
which requires considerable effort and knowledge. For professional, organized crime (e.g. money
laundering) it may be profitable to constantly adapt its processes to outmaneuver investigators,
while for the crime of opportunity or crime out of a desperate situation the information exchange
and sophistication level needed for a high adaptability is expected to be lower. High fraud volatil-
ity shortens the time a model is accurate and therefore requires a high adaptability rate of fraud
detection solutions alike, which motivates the use of outlier detection methods, as labeled data
from the past may not be adequate for modeling fraud in the future. This, in turn, implies con-
siderable evaluation and refining resources from experts.
2.4.4 Population Factors
Inter Object Heterogeneity Level
The main differentiation we found in related work in terms of the examined population is based
on heterogeneity. While some approaches rely on a global model for fraud based on the whole
population, others argue that a significant (behaviour) heterogeneity between different objects
(e.g. accounts) motivates the calculation for similar groups or even individuals. Local models
increase the complexity of the system, but are valuable in situations where events may be sus-
picious for one instance while being completely reasonable for another instances. [Cahill et al.,
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2002] states that “classifying accounts into segments and applying thresholds to each segment
separately may improve performance, but at the expense of multiplying the number of thresh-
olds that have to be managed”.
Intra Object Heterogeneity Level
In [Fawcett et al., 1997], it is stated that “superimposition fraud is detectable if the legitimate
users have fairly regular behavior that is generally distinguishable from the fraudulent behav-
ior”. Unfortunately, peoples situations and the way they make use of their resources are exposed
to change. A credit card owner may go on holiday and exhibit completely different purchasing
behavior in a far country, which is otherwise a possible evidence for a stolen credit card. The
usage patterns of bank accounts may alter as their owners change living arrangements, switch
wage accounts or have other, irreproducible reasons. As an example, unsupervised approaches
will suffer from both a high level of inter and intra object heterogeneity. While approaches de-
tecting behavior change will produce a substantial amount of false alerts in the presence of a high
intra object heterogeneity, a high inter object heterogeneity may make it impossible to determine
common behavior or to detect outliers for discrimination between fraud and legitimate patterns.
2.4.5 Conclusion
Based on the factors introduced above, we propose the following questions to be asked when
considering a fraud detection problem:
• What is the form and level of prior knowledge available? (PK)
• What is the level of data accessibility?
• What are the constraints given by the IT landscape?
• What are the available computational resources?
• What is the (technical) expertise level of the users?
• What evaluation and refinement resources are (and will be) dispensable? (ER)
• What is the expected visibility level of fraud? (VL)
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• What is the expected change level of fraud? (CL)
• What is the expected volatility level of fraud?
• What is the heterogeneity level of the population? (HL)
In table 2.3, we try to give a condensed view of what others have done in the according situation.
Note that we ignored some of the questions posed above. While being relevant for the design
process, possible answers to those questions can have a huge variety and are inappropriate for
a crisp categorization. Considerations about those questions can be found above. Furthermore,
we combined different parameter values where reasonable: The right choice of either a single
event or aggregated event view is an important factor, but we found that approaches using one
view should generally be readily adaptable to the other. While high evaluation resources are re-
quired in the presence of low prior knowledge, it is reasonable to state that for higher levels of
prior knowledge, extensive evaluation resources are still very valuable, but not a strict require-
ment. Where approaches explicitly dedicated to either global or local solutions do not exist, we
combined these values and added some hints in the remarks. We argue that a focus on behavior
change implies a (temporal) relation visibility level. The opposite is not necessarily true. Tempo-
ral patterns can be of interest while the focus does not lie on behavior change but static patterns.
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2.4.6 Applying The Framework To Our Project
We now make use of the unifying framework to assess the situation we met and justify our design
decisions.
• Prior Knowledge Level: Model Knowledge available, Identification Knowledge not available
At the beginning of the collaboration with Alphafin, we were given a number of internal
fraud case reports in an unstructured free text format the according machine readable data
(fraudulent transactions, involved accounts) was neither specified in detail in the reports
nor accessible for analysis. The limited amount of informal identification knowledge could
therefore not be converted to machine-readable identification knowledge. However, model
knowledge could be established in analyzing the reports and learning from fraud experts
in extensive discussions. Furthermore, in the course of our project, Alphafin started to ex-
ternalize fraud expert knowledge and use it for developing a SQL-based alert system. This
resulted in further, well-specified model knowledge.
Given this situation, we had to omit supervised data mining approaches. The availability
of pattern matching approaches motivates the use of pattern matching.
• Data Accessibility: Largely accessible, however at a late stage
In the early stages of the project, we had to rely exclusively on the model knowledge given
by fraud experts. Not until designing and implementing part of the proposed system —
specifically the visualization component — were we given access to a large amount of rel-
evant data, which was crucial for numerous detail decisions and configuration of our ap-
proach. The fact that data access for model calculation was initially not given and its fu-
ture accessibility remained unclear for a long time further motivated the focus on available
model knowledge.
• IT Landscape Constraints: Java, SQL, no reformatting/ local copies
We were constrained to Java and data access via basic SQL (no PL/SQL, stored procedures
or similar). Reformatting the data was out of scope not only because of the prohibition of
local copies but also by the requirement to design an approach which is directly applicable
to the whole data warehouse. Furthermore, any changes on the database or hardware level
were prohibited. This disqualifies the use of existing systems making use of special formats
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as e.g. Subdue.
• Available Computational Resources
As the database system is concurrently used by various applications and users, database
answer time was subject to a considerable variance due to changing workload. Further-
more, we had no influence on index structures and data organization, which was optimized
for other productive applications. In the presence of the massive amount of data and the
limited computational resources on the client, the chosen approach had to be of adequate
computational complexity to reliably produce results within a reasonable amount of time.
• User Expertise
From beginning, we tried to build our approach as close as possible to the existing business
processes and concepts with which potential users are already familiar. This allows for a
straightforward integration into existing solutions and can decisively increase acceptance
of a novel approach, which is a critical success factor. This design decision disables the
use of solutions which are hard to comprehend or to evaluate. We found that even in the
case of a straightforward network component, suspiciousness assessment can be a task of
considerable complexity. Our goal was to find an adequate tradeoff between expressivity
and understandability.
• Evaluation and Refinement Resources: Low
The high workload of fraud experts and the potential complexity of the evaluation process
suggested to be prepared for low evaluation and refinement resources during the research
stage. As described in later sections, our intentions to have fraud experts generate identifica-
tion knowledge while using our system was not successful due to the lack of manpower re-
sources. This experience affirmed our decision to omit approaches which absolutely require
extensive evaluation and refinement — in particular, unsupervised mining approaches and
very broadly specified pattern retrievals.
• Fraud Visibility: Relational
No doubt a number of evidences of internal fraud is best captured on the single event or
aggregated view. As mentioned above, we argue that detection of more subtle patterns of
internal fraud requires a relational view on both the network and temporal dimension. At
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this point it is worth to note that in our case, fraudulent activity is less single object-centered
as other forms of fraud may be. Consider an external fraudster which gains access to a user
resource. Fraudulent activities will originate from the defrauded object/ node. The internal
fraudster in contrast has access to a whole set of objects/nodes in the network by default
(i.e. the advised customers) — a fact that may lead to completely different, more cross-
linked patterns and to a setting where relevant patterns emerge within company borders
with high probability. This motivates taking a relational view of the problem. We therefore
focus on a relational perspective to optimally complement Alphafins own detection system,
which covers the single event and aggregated event level.
• Fraud Change Level: Static
As an exposed employee fraudster will suffer serious consequences, internal fraud is ex-
pected to exhibit more subtle patterns as a stolen credit card, which is a prominent example
for behavior-change based approaches. The considerable intra object heterogeneity (see be-
low) may further complicate the use of a change-sensitive detector. However we do not
argue that change based systems are inappropriate. While focusing on a static approach
because of the reasons mentioned above, we propose the extension of our approach from a
static to a change based view and develop a possible design in future work.
• Population Heterogeneity
We did not conduct a systematic and exhaustive quantitative analysis of the population
heterogeneity, but both discussions with human experts and our findings when building up
business and data knowledge suggest that both intra object and inter object heterogeneity is
high. The wide range from private retail customers to corporate or institutional customers
directly indicates a high inter object heterogeneity. This motivates the use of local models.
However, the relational view motivated by the fact that the internal fraudster is a meta-user
of the network (see above) may have some non-trivial influence on these considerations.
In terms of intra object heterogeneity we found that strong and sometimes abrupt changes,
for example a complete inactiveness followed by irregular and short periods of excessive
activity are repeatedly observable. We discussed such effects with human experts, but were
not able to examine them extensively. The flexibility in terms of switching between local
and global models and adapting scorings accordingly further motivates the use of pattern
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matching techniques.
3
Solution Approaches
As argued in section 2.4.6, the situation at hand motivates the focus on relational pattern match-
ing. To set the stage for a detection component, the development of a evaluation component was
required. In this section, we will first justify and introduce our implementation of the evaluation
component, which is a visualization tool. After that, we introduce the different approaches devel-
oped for the detection component. The interaction of the two components is discussed in detail
in the case studies in chapter 4.
3.1 The Visualization Component
3.1.1 Justification
In section 2.1.2 we established the focus on relational patterns (in particular Transaction Chains
and Smurfing) in our approach. We have also mentioned that human experts require adequate vi-
sualization to efficiently and effectively find and interpret such structures. Visualization is there-
fore crucial for the envisaged approach.
One might ask why the undertaking of designing, developing and launching another visualiza-
tion tool was a critical factor for the project. After all, as mentioned before, fraud experts already
made use of commercial visualization software.
Using the existing visualization tool however was prohibitive due to the following reasons:
1. The product was only licensed for very few specialists. The approval for another, very costly
license for research was highly improbable in the given situation.
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2. The initial business regulations we were confronted with did not allow us to access the data
directly without a productive tool, and the manual process of ordering data from employees
having access was too resource- and time-consuming for research.
3. It soon became clear that the commercial system lacked crucial features (such as a direct
connection to the data warehouse) and we needed a flexible and extensible solution which
allowed adding functionality to integrate research findings. This would have been impossi-
ble when relying on a closed source commercial tool.
The consequence was to build a flexible visualization system (called TVIS1) which allows fraud
experts (and researchers likewise) to directly access the relevant data and use the salient human
pattern recognition abilities. TVIS became the linchpin of our analytic detection approach. It is not
only used to evaluate the results produced by the detection component, but also as a convenient
aid to mediate the assessment of data on the basis of relational and sequential patterns to extended
stakeholders and to demonstrate the functionality of the detection component to business experts.
“This pattern is new to me, what does it represent? How did it evolve?” These or similar questions
arise when working with TVIS in both ad-hoc and result evaluation mode. Trying to find an
answer to those questions allows for building up new pattern-related knowledge and to develop
a paradigm of “thinking-in-patterns”.
3.1.2 Main Requirements
On a very general level, the identified main requirements for TVIS were
• Flexible data request based on a number of relevant attribute values for both nodes (cus-
tomers) and edges (transactions) in the graph. Relevant attributes were previously identi-
fied in collaboration with business experts.
• Support for both ad-hoc and detection component result evaluation usage.
• Customizable graphical and tabular data views which preserve consistency on data chang-
ing operations
1TVIS stands for ”Transaction VISualization”
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• The possibility to annotate relational patterns for pattern generalization/ supervised learn-
ing (labeling)
• A number of convenience features (Saving, printing, export functions)
• Intuitive handling and acceptance by gearing towards concepts and tools already known to
future users
3.1.3 System Description
Visualization is a well known and widely used instrument in both research and industry. While
the design and development of the system at hand was indispensable to set the stage for the re-
search on detection approaches, it is of limited academic interest. In our opinion, an evaluation of
work efficiency with TVIS would most probably boil down to the finding that structural patterns
and transaction chains are more readily recognized visually than in the traditional table form for
humans. This insight is neither new nor surprising - it can easily be reproduced by the reader
by looking at Figure 3.1. We therefore only provide a high level description of the functionality
TVIS offers and decided to forgo a systematic evaluation. More implementation oriented infor-
mation can be found in [Appendix A]. The core of TVIS is formed by three different views on the
requested data.
3.1.4 The Network View
The network view display the requested data in terms of a directed single-edge graph (see Figure
3.2). Nodes represent customers. As a customer can have more than one account, nodes contain
nested graphs. In nested graphs, nodes represent accounts and edges represent carryover trans-
action between the accounts of the according customer.
Edge weights are defined by the sum of transaction amounts between the source and the target
node within the defined time window. While transactions between Alphafins customers (internal
transactions) are straightforward to display, transactions with an external counter party (external
transactions, e.g. cash withdrawals or transfers to other financial institutions) are more challeng-
ing: the desirable distinct identification of the external party is bounded by the limited data qual-
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.1: A small example of six transactions in a network view (a), a timeline view (b) and the traditional table
view (c)
ity. It is often not possible to recognize recurring external transaction partners due to ambiguous
free text identification. Two options remain: The generation of a new external node for each exter-
nal transaction, or the definition of one or more external meta-nodes which assimilate all external
parties. The two options were combined by using meta-nodes, showing an aggregated view of the
amount of money entering or leaving the company, and allowing for a view on the single trans-
actions and their external counterparties by ”opening” the meta node. After experimentation
with a single meta-node for all external parties, we decided on two role-dependent meta-nodes;
one node representing external beneficiaries and the other representing external originators. This
simplifies the display of funds inflow and outflow.
The network view allows for an overview of transaction connections, in particular for internal
transactions, which are of special interest for internal fraud detection. In the quite common
presence of recurring transaction partners, thousands of transactions may result in a clear and
straightaway meaningful image. It is this single-edge graph view on which most of the present
graph-pattern matching solutions are based on. However, as we argued before, sequential infor-
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mation may also be crucial to make sense of transactional behavior. This motivates the second
graphical representation, the timeline view.
Figure 3.2: TVIS — the Network View (real data, confidential information is made anonymous and pixelated)
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3.1.5 The Timeline View
The timeline view is focused on the sequence of single transactions. This view represents a di-
rected multi-edge network where nodes are translated into lines along the time axis. Single trans-
actions are placed on the time continuum between the lines representing the according customers
(figure 3.3). Edge weights represent single transaction amounts (in a general base currency).The
time axis can be stretched or packed. This allows for both a detailed analysis of single transactions
in an activity intense setting and for a long term overview, where single transactions may merge
and overall activity patterns are unveiled (for an example, see figure 4.5). Timeslots with no ac-
tivity can be hidden, which is valuable in the presence of sporadic activity. Again, the external
originator and external beneficiary meta nodes are used. The maximal amount of data presentable
in this view is usually considerably lower than in the network view. In particular, the maximal
number of customers is limited as the image loses clearness as it grows in its vertical dimension.
Therefore, this view is intended to be used after the data has been narrowed down to structures
of special interest using the network view.
3.1.6 The Tabular View
While nodes in the network are labeled with the according customer number and transactions are
labeled with their amounts, more node and edge attributes are needed for the assessment of pat-
terns. This additional data is provided in tabular view below the graphical view. Two individual
panels are displayed for node attributes and edge attributes to keep the distinction between the
two concepts intuitive. For example, additional node attributes may be customer name or cus-
tomer type information, the assigned customer advisor and similar. Additional edge attributes
may be the original currency of the transaction, transaction type and date or the triggering cus-
tomer advisor. The displayed selection of node and edge attributes is configurable.
3.1.7 View Editing and Consistency
For extensive pattern evaluation, the views have to be configurable and changeable. Some graph
elements may be safely discarded after a first glance. The user may become interested in addi-
tional graph elements which are not currently loaded and displayed. Moving through the total
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Figure 3.3: TVIS: The Timeline View (real data, anonymized and pixelated)
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graph in terms of discarding parts and dynamically loading other parts into the ”cone of light” is
crucial for an effective and efficient evaluation (figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Like a ”cone of light”, TVIS reveals parts of the total graph. Navigation in TVIS corresponds to moving,
enlarging or narrowing the light cone
TVIS allows for permanent deletion or temporary hiding of graph elements. The filter panel
for requesting the data gives the option to add the newly requested data to the current visualiza-
tion (instead of discarding it). A special case of this option is the neighbor search. It allows to load
all direct transaction neighbors of selected customers and therefore facilitates the expansion of the
network in directions of interest. For illustration, consider a customer with a — in some way —
noticeable business connection with a company. The investigator may want to have a closer look
at it; a neighbor search will add the transaction network of the according company and allow for a
more detailed assessment. Figure 3.5 illustrates a real world data visualization primarily based on
one customer (a), followed by two consecutive neighbour searches, incrementally revealing the
direct and indirect neighbourhood of the customer (b) and (c). Selections and modifications can
be made in any of the available views. Consistency between views is guaranteed by propagating
those actions. As selection is propagated, mapping between graph elements and the according
attributes in tabular view is straightforward.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.5: An example of a neighbour search. The primary customer of interest is marked red (real data, confidential
information masked). Two direct neighbours exhibit further connections after the search.
3.1.8 Pattern Annotation
Whenever an investigator encounters a pattern of special interest, she/he can select it, annotate it
with additional information and add it to a pattern repository, which is part of TVIS. The goals of
the pattern repository are the following:
• Knowledge exchange between fraud investigators
• Reducing knowledge drain due to personal fluctuation
• Acquiring pattern based model knowledge for (automated) specification of generalized pat-
terns
• Acquiring relational labels (that is, identification knowledge) for supervised data mining
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After the release of TVIS it soon became clear that the buildup of a pattern repository of a reason-
able size was an unrealistic goal under the given circumstances. This is due to two main reasons:
• The data warehouse only contained the data of the two most recent years at a time, older
data was therefore not available for TVIS. Given the sparsity of revealed internal fraud cases,
most of the eminent cases with numerous patterns were actually time-barred in terms of the
system.
• Limited manpower resources made the explorative search for interesting patterns impos-
sible. We therefore had to rely solely on expert interviews to externalize relevant model
knowledge.
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3.2 The Detection Component
Given the previous findings and the decision to focus on specialized pattern matching, a number
of possible approaches and variants for the detection component were developed. In the follow-
ing, each approach is discussed in detail.
3.2.1 The ChainFinder
The ChainFinder is an extension of an existing, well-known graph pattern matching technique,
namely tree-based search (see [Chakrabarti and Faloutsos, 2006]). The algorithm is tailored to
meet the following requirements:
• Matching of tempo-relational patterns in a multigraph.
• Matching of graph patterns with relational constraints on node or edge attributes
• Feasibility in the presence of strict technical constraints and massive amounts of data
• Straightforward, comprehensible functionality to ease acceptance and practicability for busi-
ness users
More specifically, the main intent was to find a feasible way of retrieving Transaction Chains
and Smurfing patterns as described and motivated above (section 2.1.2). The problem was solved
by taking the well-known technique of search-based pattern matching and slightly extending it
with the concept of information particles travelling along search paths.
In contrast to classic tree traversal, the goal state is not defined by reaching a certain node, but by
the content of the particles, which accumulate information on traversed nodes and edges. Typ-
ically, not the individual node and edge attribute values are of interest, but their relationship to
each other. The compatibility of attribute values are used for pruning the search space.
Therewith, the ChainFinder forgoes general sub-graph homo/isomorphism matching capability
in favor of a intuitive chain and Smurfing pattern matching. It is worth noting that the Chain-
Finder, being a tree-search based approach, starts searching for the patterns in question at a dedi-
cated root node at any one time. This procedure is reasonable if a subset of nodes in the graph is
of special interest in respect to their role as potential sources (or intermediaries/target accounts
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as mentioned below). For an unspecific overall search in the total graph for chains starting at any
point, runtime as well as results may be exposed to considerable redundancy. Other approaches
(as the GraphSlider mentioned below) may be favorable in this setting. However, in most applica-
tion settings we met, the assumption of a subset of special interest was appropriate.
The mode of operation is illustrated in figure 3.6. The root node (a) is expanded by retrieving its
successors (that is, in the default case, its beneficiary counterparties) (b). Particles are sent from
the root node to the successors along the edges (i.e., transactions) in the search tree. The particles
are encoded with transaction information of interest for the matching, for example transaction
amount, triggering client advisor and similar (c). In the following, each of the successor nodes is
expanded (d). The particles at the successor nodes are sent along a new edge if they are compatible
with the transaction(s) in question (e,f).
Depending on the configuration, a particle may for example be compatible to a new transaction if
• the triggering client advisor matches, and
• the current transaction amount encoded in the particle is similar to the new amount, and
• the date of the last transaction in the particle is shortly before the new transaction date
When a particle is sent along a new edge, it is updated with information about the visited path
while travelling. Hence, particles essentially encode information about chains of edges.
Recursively, any node containing particles is expanded and all its particles are investigated for
further dissemination (g,h). Whether a particle is allowed to travel further always depends on
the compatibility of information it contains with edges along which it is scheduled to proceed. If
no compatible path is available, the particle ends its journey. It gets logged if the path it travelled
is of sufficient, user-defined length (and is discarded otherwise) (i) . The algorithm ends when all
particles have completed their journey. A number of issues and variants of the basic algorithm
are considered in the following sections.
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Algorithm 1 The ChainFinder Pseudocode
1: /* set up data structures */
2: for each successor node s of RootNode do
3: s.particles ← buildParticles (n,s)
4: if s.particles 6= ∅ then
5: push s on stack
6: end if
7: end for
8:
9: /* search graph */
10: while stack non-empty do
11: n← pop stack
12:
13: /* expand where particle is compatible /*
14: usedParticles ← ∅
15: for each s ∈ successor(n) do
16: for each particle p ∈ n.particles do
17: if compatible(p, edge(n,s)) then
18: p.path ← p.path ∪ edge(n,s)
19: s.particles ← s.particles ∪ p
20: if s /∈ stack then
21: push s on stack
22: end if
23: usedParticles ← usedParticles ∪ p
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27:
28: /* clear up remaining, non-travelling particles */
29: n.particles ← n.particles \ usedPartciles
30: for p ∈ n.particles do
31: if p.pathlength ≥minimumlength then
32: log(p)
33: end if
34: n.particles ← n.particles \ p
35: end for
36: end while
Where: compatible(x,y) encodes the traveling condition, edge (x,y) retrieves the relevant edges, log(x) writes a
particle/path to the log, and buildParticles(x,y) builds the necessary particles from the first edge. text
Particle Cloning
A travelling particle can meet more than one compatible transaction for traversal at a node. As it
cannot be decided which of the possible transactions is the “true” one for the chain, the particle
gets cloned and an instance is sent along each compatible transaction. Therefore, a single particle
can end up in numerous logged chains depending on how many times it was cloned during its
journey. Intense cloning decreases the probability of “true single chains”. This consideration is
the basis of the Random Structure Identification introduced in the following section.
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Random Structure Identification
First experiments with the ChainFinder revealed that repeatedly, false positives were retrieved
where chain-like structures emerged obviously randomly out of intense transaction behavior. It
was observed that these random structures commonly lead to numerous particle splits.
Consider a customer A transferring 5000 dollars to a customer B, which has hundreds of incom-
ing and outgoing transactions each day (e.g. a big investment company). The probability that
some of those numerous outgoing transactions will match the incoming amount of the transac-
tion from customer A is very large, although the two payments are fully independent of each
other. To decrease retrieval of such structures, the number of allowed splits (i.e. clones, see pre-
vious section) can be limited. If it is exceeded, the originating particle is discarded and logging is
avoided. Of course, it cannot be guaranteed that this approach is not eliminating true positives
embedded in an activity-intense context. While a maximum number of 3 splits showed reason-
able results in our experiments, the optimal value is highly dependent on the underlying data
and the configuration of the ChainFinder.
Single Chain vs Sum Chain Detection
Patterns previously referred to as Transaction Chains are retrieved in Single Chain mode, Smurf-
ing patterns in Sum Chain mode. The main difference lies in the particle generation. In single
chain mode, each individual transaction originating at the root node generates a discrete particle.
In sum chain mode, particles are not generated for every single transaction, but for aggregated
transaction sums within a defined time window. In the simplest case, all available transactions
originating at a root node are summed up and one single particle is generated, holding the aggre-
gated sum2. For smaller window sizes (for example a week or month), a particle gets generated
for each propagation, summing up all transaction within the current window. From a visualiza-
tion perspective, the single chain mode therefore refers to the timeline view where the sum chain
mode rather refers to the network view. The choice of an adequate time window for the sum
chain mode deserves a closer look.
Choosing a very small window (and propagation step) size may quickly lead to a prohibitively
2That is, if A paid, in total, 100’000 dollars to B over the whole period of time the data is available (in our case two
years), one single particle is generated with code ”100’000”. If B paid a sum of approximately 100’000 dollars to C during
this period, a chain of length 2 is registered.
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large number of generated particles, increasing the probability of random hits to an unacceptable
level. At a large window size, the algorithm may not be able to catch local smurfing patterns
because of interfering transactions before or after the smurfing. Therefore, the right choice for the
window size heavily depends on two factors :
• The typical timeframe for a smurfing pattern
• The degree of interference of legal activities with illegal smurfing (or the probability that a
connection between two node contains both illegal and legal transactions).
Figure 3.7 illustrates a window size which is too small for the occurring smurfing. A simple solu-
tion to the problem of choosing the right window size is, as mentioned above, to aggregate over
the total available interval, which is plausible under the assumption that smurfing is exclusive
and not interspersed into other behaviour (or other behaviour is marginal enough to not bias the
detection). We limited our experiments to this setting.
Figure 3.7: An example of an inadequate window size for smurfing detection
Timeline Scoring
Related to sum chain detection is the Timeline Scoring model that was implemented for further
assessment of potential Smurfing. The underlying assumption is that in Smurfing, money tends
to be transferred to an intermediary account before it is withdrawn, independently from the ac-
count balance. The timeline score assesses the accordance of the pattern with this rule. A simple
implementation takes the aggregated amount of money which was withdrawn before being de-
posited as a negative score. The lower the score is, the lower is the probability that the according
sum chain is smurfing in respect to the assumption above.
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Search Direction
In the default case, the subset of nodes of interest (that is, the root set) consists of potential chain
sources, i.e., particles start at outgoing transactions. The ChainFinder can be configured to start
at potential chain sinks, so particles will start at incoming transactions of the root and travel up-
wards. A third possibility is the definition of intermediary nodes where particles are sent down-
and upwards simultaneously. This slightly increases the complexity of the algorithm as the par-
ticles tracking the same chain in opposite directions have to communicate with each other to
determine the chains current length. While theoretically equivalent, a particle travelling upwards
turned out to be substantially slower than a particle travelling downwards in our setting, which
is caused by the index structure of the database.
Reporting Date Loop Detection
When detecting chains, paths containing loops are eliminated. However, settings exist where the
detection of loops is of interest. In section 2.1.2 , it was mentioned that a fraudster may temporar-
ily try to balance missing amounts, in particular in the wake of an approaching known reporting
date, where accounts are checked internally or by the customer. This can lead to the deposit
shortly before and withdrawal shortly after a certain date. Accordingly configured, the Chain-
Finder can detect those patterns.
Smurfing may make use of several source/ intermediary and target nodes. At this point, pat-
terns are getting very complex. The more complex and distributed a pattern is, the higher is
the probability of false positives expected to be. While this may not be true for other fields, the
assumption seems reasonable that in internal fraud, sophisticated, “faultless” smurfing patterns
over distributed sources, intermediaries and/or targets are improbable. For simplicity, we de-
cided to limit our experiments to single role nodes. All the same we developed a number of ideas
and considerations as possible starting points for future work, which are discussed in the accord-
ing section.
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Particle Compatibility Configuration
The conditions on which a particle is allowed to travel along a path are crucial for pattern speci-
fication. This involves configuration of the maximum time span between two consecutive trans-
actions, the maximal amount deviation allowed, and the minimal length of a chain to be logged
after it stopped growing. In respect to the nature of chains in the present internal fraud setting
we implemented an additional constraint checking if all transactions of a Chain or Smurfing are
triggered by the same employee. Further compatibility constraints may easily be added, incor-
porating any checks on account or transaction attributes. For instance, it may make sense to set
the constraint that the last transaction in a chain is ending outside the financial institue (at an
external party) and/or is a cash transaction. The definition of further constraints may be part of a
configuration refinement.
A word on implementation issues
Two different implementations were used for experimentation with real data — a Java/SQL ver-
sion and simplified pure SQL version. Main differences between the two implementations are:
• Runtime performance
Implementing a tree search in Java and SQL leads to a very high communication overhead
as each node expansion triggers an individual SQL query. A pure SQL implementation is
therefore, unsurprisingly, substantially faster, which in particular becomes apparent when
a runtime evaluation is done on synthetic data.
• Reliability
The queries of the pure SQL implementation turned out to be too complex when confronted
with huge amounts of data in the real world setting at hand. First experimentations with
the pure SQL implementation repeatedly were abortive due to database overload. As the
database management system had to be treated as an immutable blackbox, the definite
causes and limits could not be determined. However, the highly variable workload and
architecture optimization for other applications are assumed to have a considerable influ-
ence . The Java implementation with its numerous but simple individual queries and con-
stant result logging proved to be more reliable and feasible under the given conditions with
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massive amounts of data.
• Functionality/ Expressivity
The pure SQL implementation is very limited in functionality and expressivity, in particular
as the use of extended constructs such as stored procedures or user defined functions was
not possible.
• Configurability/ Extensibility
Likewise, the Java implementation is easier to configure and to extend which motivated the
use of this version both in experimentation and discussion with business experts.
In summary, it can be stated that the SQL-Version was used for experimentation on limited
subsets to produce fast results while the Java/SQL version was used whenever the higher expres-
sivity and reliability was necessary, and optimized runtime was secondary.
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3.2.2 Excursus: An Alternative Idea - The GraphSlider
The underlying idea of the GraphSlider is — instead of starting at a dedicated root node and ex-
panding selected paths from there — to move a sliding window over the graph’s time dimension.
First, transactions (an according nodes) within the interval [t0, t1] (where t1 = t0 +WindowSize)
are loaded. At each time step, the sliding window is moved forward according to the configured
step size — that is, transactions in the fringe [t1, t1+StepSize] are added, transactions in the fringe
[t0, t0 + StepSize] are discarded). At each time step, three functions are applied to the subgraph
in the current time window:
• Scoring Function
The scoring function assigns a score s to each node ni depending on its direct neighbors
Mi ⊂ N and the transactions between ni and its direct neighbors Ti ⊂ E, that is, ( sni =
f(Mi, Ti). One or more scoring functions accounting for different properties can be applied
and added to a nodes score. Possible scoring functions are for instance:
– Intermediary Node Scoring
A nodes score is increased for each outgoing transaction matching an incoming trans-
action within the current time window in terms of its amount. The shorter two trans-
actions succeed, the higher the resulting score will be due to repeated scoring after
window propagation. A possible variant is the use of aggregated amounts within the
time window for structuring detection. Aggregation may be done in account pairs or
over all connected originators and beneficiaries .
– Regularity Scoring
A node’s score is decreased if the transactions in the current time window are assessed
to be regular. With the help of a regularity index, it is decided if the relation of two
accounts is based on regular payments, which typically reduces suspiciousness. Nu-
merous legal recurrent payment relations exhibit transactions in regular time intervals
(e.g. monthly wage or interest payments).
• Spreading Function
After scoring, a spreading function spreads a fraction f of a nodes score to its direct neigh-
bors. This allows propagating scores over the network and accounting for connected sub-
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graphs of high scoring nodes. The spreading of scores can be seen as a variant of the guilt-
by-association-concept [Macskassy and Provost, 2005].
• Ageing Function (Temporal weighting)
The ageing function decreases the score of a node at each time step right after propagation
(prior to scoring and spreading). This accounts for the fact that recent events are of higher
relevance for the current state than events that occurred earlier.
If a node’s score exceeds a defined threshold, the node is added to a persistent alert graph
with its transactions in the current time window. The alert graph therefore represents a
subgraph consisting of structures of interest.
An illustrative version of the GraphSlider was implemented. The implementation was ex-
tended and evaluated in [Meier, 2009]. Although the approach showed some potential, the
hardware resource requirements of the chosen implementation was prohibitive for an eval-
uation on real data. Even if performance problems could have been resolved, the problem
remains that this approach needs extensive parameter setting. Finding the optimal settings
requires time-consuming exploration. It soon became clear that this approach is too com-
plex to experience quick wins and acceptance in Alphafin, why further development was
abandoned. More detailed information on the GraphSlider and evaluation on synthetic data
is available in [Meier, 2009].
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3.2.3 The Transaction Matcher (TMatch )
TMatch is another implementation of the detection component which provides extended struc-
tural analysis. The structural analysis may be done on top of ChainFinder results and/or results
from other pattern matching algorithms. Therefore, the ChainFinder algorithm may be seen as a
possible, but not required part of TMatch. In the following, the considerations that motivate the
development of TMatch are given. After this, the modules constituting TMatch are introduced
and described.
Problem description
So far, we have focused on detecting relevant pattern instances in the data. After the first experi-
ments with the ChainFinder and TVIS on real data, it soon became clear that single occurrences of
those patterns may, at least at Alphafin, occasionally occur in non-fraudulent behaviour — which
is not very surprising. Instead of looking at single pattern matches, it turned out to be of much
higher interest to investigate groups of pattern matches that in some way belong together, for
example all transaction chains triggered by the same employee. When looking at example visu-
alizations, internal fraud experts confirmed that highly interconnected groups of pattern matches
are much more interesting than disjointed single occurrences.
Figure 3.2.3 gives an illustrative example. In (a), a group of five identified chains for one em-
ployee is given in both timeline (left) and network view (right). The single occurrences of chains
are not interconnected to each other. This leads to small, isolated components in the network
view. In (b), the same views are shown for another employee. The chain transactions result in a
more interlinked structure, which may be of higher interest3.
3 Such a structural analysis of the network view can be done using TVIS— a detailed real world example is given in
case study I (4.3).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.8: Two examples of chain groups
When relying solely on the ChainFinder in the detection component, structural properties of
graphs consisting of grouped chains are assessed manually. TMatch, as a consequence, aims at
automating the structural analysis of groups of pattern matches by finding and scoring graph
structures of interest.
Solution Approach: TMatch Functionality Overview
TMatch works as follows: Given a graph (which may consist of pattern matches), it identifies
connected subgraphs of a minimal user-defined size and assigns each subgraph a number of
scores according to its structural attributes. Similar to the concept of ”centerpiece subgraphs”
[Tong and Faloutsos, 2006], the user is allowed to define a number of nodes (the StartSet) which
serve as starting points in the search for components. This is in particular relevant for AML
related topics where the definition of the population and the prior pattern matchers may be less
restrictive as in internal fraud, which leads to very large graphs4.
For example, the StartSet may consist of customers of a defined region that exhibit uncom-
monly high cash transaction activity (cash customers). The total population analyzed may be all
4If the analyzed graph is relatively small as in typical IF investigations, the limiting factor of a dedicated StartSet and
the according incremental search may not make sense. Instead, the whole graph is typically loaded into memory and
searched for connected subgraphs.
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the customers in the region of interest. The StartSet is therefore a subset of the population. The
goal is to identify all the connected subgraphs that contain at least one of the cash customers. The
score of a subgraph is typically the higher the more cash customers it contains.
More generally speaking, the goal is to find clusters of customers that are of particular interest.
As in [Tong et al., 2007], connections between StartSet nodes via other nodes in the population are
found with this strategy. Figure 3.9 illustrates example structures identified by TMatch5. Nodes
in the StartSet are marked red. The structure encircled green is a structure that is identified by
TMatch as it contains at least one node from the StartSet . The red encircled structure is ignored
as it only consists of nodes that are not in the StartSet . The other subgraphs are not retrieved as
the minimal size (in this case 4) is not reached. Similar constraints can also be added concerning
for example the minimal graph density within a connected subgraph.
Figure 3.9: TMatch graph component identification example
TMatch Modules
By providing strucutral scoring of groups of pattern matches, TMatch constitutes an extended
detection component of which the ChainFinder is (or can be) a part of. The overall architecture
of TMatch consists of the modules illustrated in figure 3.10. In the following, those modules are
shortly discussed.
5 In graph theory, subgraphs are also called (graph) components. We will use these two terms interchangeably in the
following.
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Figure 3.10: The TMatch modules
• Base Graph
The Base Graph is implemented as a database view. It’s function is to reformat the underly-
ing data and present it in a suitable way to the subsequent modules. The Base Graph may
represent a partition of the entire available graph, typically in terms of selected business re-
gions. For performance and feasibility reasons, this view should be kept relatively simple.
In settings where the database provides the data in a suitable form, it may be possible to do
without a view and directly access the data tables. In Alphafin, however, the complexity of
the database structure required a comprehensive optimized view definition.
• Base Pattern Matchers
One or several Base Pattern Matchers may be applied to the Base Graph, condensing it to
structures of special interest . The ChainFinder is an example of a Base Pattern Matcher.
Matches are transferred to an Alert Graph for further analysis. A simpler, but for AML top-
ics valuable example of a Base Pattern Matcher is the “High Amount Path”-Matcher. It only
transfers edges exceeding a minimal aggregated transaction amount to the Alert Graph6.
The Alert Graph, as the one introduced in the GraphSlider, consequently solely consists of
patterns of special interest7.
6Note that the ChainFinder, given according particle compatibility definitions, accomplishes this goal.
7Defining the Base Graph and applying the Base Pattern Matchers to form the Alert Graph could theoretically be
combined into one, more complex database view. Separating the two steps however proved to be more flexible and
increased reusability in application.
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• Alert Graph
As described above, the Alert Graph combines the results, or generated alerts of the Base
Pattern Matchers. Combination of results may be conjunctive or disjunctive. In our experi-
ments, we typically restricted the number of Base Pattern Matchers to one, to keep the end
results as interpretable as possible. If no Base Pattern Matcher is applied, the Alert Graph is
represented by the entire Base Graph.
• Graph Expander
The basic idea of the Graph Expander is motivated by business requirements. The expander
module starts analysis of the given graph at a number of user-defined nodes, which form the
StartSet. From each StartSet node, the graph is expanded, recursively looking for adjacent
nodes. Whether an adjacent node is considered or ignored depends on the configuration
settings of TMatch. For example, only nodes with a minimal turnover or an in/outflow
ratio similar to 1 may be considered.
The expansion process is highly configurable. Expansion of a single path is closed when no
connections are left or the search depth reaches a configured maximum. To avoid redundant
work, path expansion also finishes when another member of the StartSet is met (as a new
expansion will start from this point) or a node already visited is detected.
Several implementations are available to optimize the runtime/performance tradeoff ac-
cording to the size of the graph and resources at hand. In particular, a RAM based imple-
mentation can be used for small graph partitions, while a DB version is available, which
incrementally loads the required data and keeps the memory used at a minimum.This al-
lows for the analysis of huge datasets. A threaded version was implemented to optimize
runtime in the presence of a resilient data base system.
• (Graph) Component Finder
The Graph Component Finder uses the results from the previous expander step and calcu-
lates all the maximal connected components. After this, the Component Finder filters the
graph components according to the configuration, calculates additional metrics, and stores
the remaining subgraphs and metrics in the database. The result is a list of subgraphs, or-
dered by node size. Table 3.1 describes the used metrics.
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Metric Summary
Graph Density The graph (degree) density is calculated as the number of edges |E|
divided by the possible number of edges (|N|(|N|-1) in a directed
graph) [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]
Degree Centrality The degree centrality of a node is defined as as the number of links
incident upon the node divided by the possible number of links (|N|-
1) [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. In the basic implementation, we
calculate the undirected degree centrality. The maximal degree cen-
trality occurring in a subgraph is logged. A value of 1 for a node
means that the node is connected with all other nodes in the sub-
graph. A maximum centrality of 1 and a low graph density in a
subgraph are indicators of a ”star structure”.
Cycle-Node-Ratio The cycle-node-ratio is calculated by creating a subgraph of all cy-
cles. The ratio is the node size of the found cycle-subgraph, divided
by the size of the analyzed subgraph from the Component Finder
results.
Total-Amount-In This value contains the sum of all incoming transaction amounts.
Total-Amount-Out This value contains the sum of all outgoing transaction amounts.
Total-Amount-In Flag If the Total-Amount-In value is higher or equals than the configured
threshold, this flag will be set to 1.
Total-Amount-Out Flag If the Total-Amount-Out value is higher or equals than the config-
ured threshold, this flag will be set to 1.
Passage Flag If the difference of Total-Amount-In and Total-Amount-Out is
higher or equals than the configured threshold, this flag will be set
to 1.
Table 3.1: The calculated component metrics and flags.
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• Component scorer
After separation into graph components, several scorer models are loaded for each sub-
graph, calculate the score and save it to the database. Individual scorers can be added or
removed in configuration. The scorer models currently included are:
– PassageScore
denotes the fraction of passage nodes in the component |Pi||Ni| where Pi is the set of
passage nodes in component i and Ni is the set of all nodes in component i. If a node
is a passage node is calculated in the Component Finder.
– PassagePathScore
The set of PassagePaths Xi in component i is defined by specified transaction paths8 in
component i where every node ni in the path is an element of Pi. Each PassagePath
x ∈ Xi has a maximal length depending on the number of visited passage nodes9. The
PassagePathScore represents the average length of all PassagePaths j in component i∑
length(x)
|Xi| .
– TransactionTypeCountScore
calculates the fraction of transaction of a certain type |Et||Ei| where Et is the set of edges
of 1 − n transaction types in a user defined list in component i and Ei is the set of all
transaction in component i.
– TransactionTypeAmountScore
Instead of counting occurrences, this scorer calculates the sum of transaction amounts
in Et and its fraction of the sum of all transaction amounts in Ei, that is,∑
y∈Et
amount(y)∑
z∈Ei
amount(z)
– MaximumFlowScore
This scorer makes use of an additional user defined set Nsink which denotes possi-
ble target or sink accounts in the analyzed population, for instance accounts with a
8for example, transaction chains
9note that the ChainFinder algorithm is designed to only log maximal length paths
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considerable cash outflow. The maximum flow between nodes nistart ∈ (Nstart ∩ Ni)
and nodes nisink ∈ (Nsink ∩ Ni) is calculated. This is done by adding two artificial
meta-nodes to component i, one connecting all nodes in N istart and one connecting all
nodes in N isink. After this, the Edmonds-Karp Maximum Flow algorithm [Edmonds and
Karp, 1972] is used to calculate the maximum flow between these two meta-nodes in
component i.
– StartSetScoreModel
This score calculates the fraction of all start nodes in component i |N
i
start|
|Ni| .
– SizeScore
is represented by |Ni|∑n
i=0 |Ni| and denotes the size of component i according to all nodes
in the analyzed population being part of any component.
• TMatchViz
TMatchViz is a basic graphical user interface for TMatch, providing access to predefined
search settings and defining new search configurations. Identified components and their
scores are displayed in a result view. TMatchViz also offers a very basic graph visualization
for quick assessment of components. Detailed investigation of results is typically done in
the visualization component TVIS.
A more detailed descriptions of architecture and implementation issues of TMatch can be
found in [Moll, 2009].

4
Application and Evaluation
In this section, a number of evaluation issues are considered. How can such a system be evalu-
ated in a meaningful way? How were similar systems and approaches evaluated? These are the
questions we try answer. After this, two case studies describing real world applications are given
as detailed as non-disclosure agreements allow. For completeness, a synthetic data evaluation
is given and the problem of synthetic generation is discussed in a nutshell. As stated above, an
extensive evaluation of the visualization component in ad hoc use has not been made. However,
discussions with several potential future business stakeholders suggest an informal cost savings
estimation in comparison to traditional, table based analysis of data, which concludes the appli-
cation chapter.
4.1 Application Considerations
As mentioned in the related work section, numerous analytical fraud detection approaches in
research rely on labeled data, that is, on a reasonable number of both positive and negative
examples. As Bruce Schneier puts it, ”Data Mining works best when there’s a well-defined
profile you’re searching for, a reasonable number of attacks per year, and a low cost of false
alarms.”[Schneier, 2006] This is not only an ideal initial situation for the application of a large
number of ready-to-use supervised data mining algorithms, but also makes evaluation straight-
forward. The performance of the detection component can be given by means of a confusion matrix
or a ROC-Curve and is well defined and directly comparable to other models which are calculated
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on the same data.
As soon as labels are not available — as in our case —, evaluation is more problematic and a
number of issues has to be considered that we introduced in the first chapter (Section 1.2 ) and
review at this point in a nutshell.
Experts are needed to assess the results and decide if the classification of an instance or pattern
as fraudulent (or, in a weaker form, as ”relevant” or ”interesting”) by the detection component is
justified or a false alert. The true class of a pattern may not be straightforward to assign even for
an expert and might also be a matter of opinion.
While the ratio of false alerts, also called false positives may be approximately estimated this way,
the problem of a completely unknown false negative rate remains. It lies in the nature of the prob-
lem that there always may be fraudulent instances or patterns in the data which nobody (except
the fraudster) has knowledge of.
Detection components, if not relying solely on identification knowledge (labels), require human
expert input. The overall assumptions, the corresponding choice and design as well as the de-
tailed configuration of a detection approach may (and should) be influenced by the information
available from human experts. This means that, in a certain sense, evaluation of a real world
fraud detection system inseparably includes evaluation of human expert knowledge.
Furthermore, a fraud system improves with the growing experience of its users, possibly over
years. First applications to real world problems may have an explorative character which, ideally,
reveals potential. Apart from the quality of expert knowledge, performance of a real world fraud
detection system may therewith rather measure the level of available experience and refinement
during research than the performance of the system itself.
Concerning similar fraud detection systems, LAW [Wolverton et al., 2003] limits evaluation to
matching runtime. For FAIS [Senator et al., 1995] and ADS [Kirkland et al., 1998] however, the
authors are able to reports numbers that emerged from using the system for several years. While
for ADS , ”hits” are defined as ”breaks that have resulted in follow-up actions1”, the article on
FAIS reports, ”109 feedback forms from outside agencies in addition to feedback from inhouse in-
vestigations, where 90 percent of the feedback indicates either new cases opened or relevance to
ongoing investigations” without further explanation. Additionally, one closed case with follow-
1which is, as reported, the case for 800 out of 7000 breaks during 9 months
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up investigation, prosecution and conviction resulting from a lead generated by the system is
reported2.
Unfortunately, we are not able to deliver such numbers as the productive use for years and the
”dedicated group of intelligence analysts engaged full-time in reviewing, validating and pursu-
ing potential leads generated by the system” as for example mentioned in [Senator et al., 1995] is
not given.
As our approach heavily relies on graph pattern matching, common evaluation in this research
area may be considered as well. The survey by Gallagher [Gallagher, 2006a] discusses the topic
of graph pattern matching evaluation. Most publications deliver runtime performance measures.
As graph properties and algorithm designs and requirements are highly varying between dif-
ferent publications and fields of application, comparing runtime is of very limited significance.
Furthermore, while an optimization of runtime may be the main issue from a theoretic point of
view in the emerging graph pattern matching research area, feasibility is the main concern in ap-
plied research. As we learned when working with the ChainFinder, the fastest implementation is
not always the most feasible one. At this point it is worth noting that all graph pattern matching
approaches in the survey [Gallagher, 2006a] were only applied to substantially smaller graphs
than the one our approaches were applied to.
The considerations above, given the small size of our project and the limited expert resources, led
to the decision to evaluate our system by means of exemplary case studies on real world prob-
lems. As defined in the introduction, expert assessment in terms of interestingness was our main
concern when evaluating. Other evaluation measures are partly used where justified by the case
study and are explained in the according section.
2The authors also give the number of analyzed transactions (approximately 200’000 transactions each week) and the
number of leads for 1993 (27), 1994 (75) and part of 1995 (>300).
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4.2 The Data Set
The data sets used for the following case studies are based on a data warehouse which has been
developed at Alphafin for analytic purposes in the area of fraud, compliance and risk related top-
ics.
The integrated view which became possible with the development of such a data warehouse
forms a good initial situation. The complexity of the data required comprehensive business un-
derstanding and considerable data preprocessing even for the most basic views. Acting upon
fraud expert advice, we therefore minimized the amount of data in terms of data fields for sim-
plicity and feasibility reasons in the context of this thesis. The data warehouse contains all trans-
actions within a time window of two years to the current date. The exact size of the corresponding
graph is therefore constantly changing. The number of all transactions available is more than one
billion, involving 16 million customer accounts and a considerably higher number of accounts ex-
ternal to the financial institute. To illustrate the nature of the transaction graph, Figure 4.1 on the
facing page shows the in and out degrees of the network within Alphafin (without transactions
across company borders).
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Figure 4.1: Real world data degree distribution between customers of Alphafin
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4.3 Case Study I: Internal Fraud Analysis
In collaboration with fraud experts, an example case study on real world data was defined and
conducted. The results presented in this thesis had to be made anonymous for confidentiality rea-
sons. Accounts and customers respectively are labeled with identification information in TVIS,
but appear blank in the following figures. As the tabular view cannot be given, but is crucial
for the assessment of structures, we try to partially compensate the information loss with more
general and therefore noncritical explanations. In addition, it has to be stated that a detailed in-
vestigation includes further data sources and systems — as for example the client contact history.
4.3.1 Evaluation Goals
The goal of this case study was to evaluate the following three aspects:
• Commonness of Chain Structures
Although transaction chains are known to play a major role in numerous analyzed fraud
cases, the commonness of these structures in normal transaction behavior was widely un-
known. By examining the frequency and context of transaction chains, their discriminative
power in fraud detection may be estimated. How common are chains? Are there defined
line-ups where chains emerge in normal, daily business? These and similar question were
considered in the case study.
• Identification of a Reference Fraud Case
In particular, a reference case contained in the available data was proposed by fraud ex-
perts. The ChainFinder was configured without detailed knowledge of the case but com-
mon model knowledge. The ranking of the reference case in the ChainFinders suspicious-
ness scoring model (precision) and the portion of detected transactions being part of the
case (recall) was evaluated.
• Investigation Efficiency
This aspect evaluates the cooperation of the ChainFinder with TVIS. The following ques-
tions were relevant: What is the average workload of investigating the produced alerts, in
particular in comparison to existing fraud detection methods? May the focus on relational
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transaction structures instead of isolated transactions in combination with visualization im-
prove investigation efficiency?
4.3.2 Data Basis and Configuration
The entire available dataset, representing a time window of two years, was scanned for chains of
a dedicated transaction type, Manual Transaction Type (MTT), which we introduced and described
in section 2.3.1.
A this point, we will repeat the characteristics of MTT transactions relevant for internal fraud
detection. Employees can trigger MTT transactions autonomously, that is, without customer or-
der in written form. While being a valuable tool for unbureaucratic and flexible customer service,
MTT is prone to misuse. Above a defined threshold th, additional control measures kick in. There-
fore, transactions with an amount > th were excluded from this analysis. Below this threshold,
fraud detection performs the task to impede misuse without decreasing the flexibility and value of
the service. The overall number of distinct customers in the analyzed data set was approximately
16 millions. For this case study, the root set was defined by each customer featuring one or more
outgoing MTT transactions. This definition is very general and was chosen with the intention to
separate the evaluation of chain structures from other known model knowledge implemented in
existing fraud filters. As the number of relevant MTT transactions was 1.1 millions, a large part of
customers did not exhibit any MTT transaction and could be excluded for the initial chain finding.
During the investigation of the results in the Transaction Visualizer, additional transaction types
were occasionally loaded, increasing the number of analyzed customers in the whole process.
Furthermore, the scope of the search was limited to transactions between Alphafin clients (no
external transactions). However, chains leaving the bank (e.g. ending in a cash transaction or
a MTT transaction to an external account) were retrieved using a second ChainFinder run where
the initial structure based on internal chains suggested it. This approach appeared to be the best
trade-off between performance and effectiveness for the rapid analysis of the entire data set given
the limited resources for our study. A more focused search may incorporate external transactions
from start. The most important configuration settings for the ChainFinder were defined as follows:
• Single chains of MTT transactions with an amount < th
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• Registrator tracking enabled: single transactions forming a chain are registered by the same
employee.
• Money remains at most seven days on intermediary accounts.
• Amount may differ within a chain up to 15%.
A simple scoring model based on the number of registered transaction chains was applied.
A higher number of registered MTT transaction chains resulted in a higher interestingness score.
For this case study, employees with a minimum of 5 registered chains were proposed for further
analysis.
It has to be repeated that techniques involving other transaction types (e.g., document or signature
forgery) may also be used in internal fraud as good as in external fraud, possibly leading to chains
and smurfing structures in a wide variety of transaction types. However, the inhibition threshold
for these actions may be higher than for misusing MTT transactions, which are just one click
away. The limitation to MTT transactions may therefore be reasonable for a starting point.
4.3.3 Commonness of Chain Structures
The overall results indicate the frequency of chain structures for MTT transactions: Figure 4.3
reveals that, before any application of exclusion criteria (see below), less than 2% of the MTT
transactions in question are part of transaction chains.
First insights motivated the definition of a number of exclusion criteria, which further reduced
identified chains and led to a ratio of less than 1%. The average chain length (that is, involved
transactions) is approximately 1.8. This fact requires explanation. While the better part of the
chains are of length 2, one transaction, in particular in high activity context, can repeatedly be
accounted for multiple chains due to particle cloning. Figure 4.2 illustrates this effect.
On the other hand, transaction chains up to length 6 were observed. The ratio of employees
with at least 5 MTT-chains to all relevant employees which registered at least one MTT transaction
is similar. From 10053 relevant employees, 100 were proposed for further analysis by the Chain-
Finder, leading to a ratio of 1%. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of those employees according
to the number of registered chains.
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Figure 4.2: A particle coming along transaction t will be cloned three times to travel along a,b, and c. This results in
4 transactions that form 3 chains of length 2.
Figure 4.3: Total number of relevant transactions and number of transactions in chains
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Figure 4.4: Number of employees and registered chains
These results indicate that for the defined transactions of interest, transaction chains are rare.
Of course, as long as it is unknown if any of the proposed employee is actually fraudulent, a
statement on the discriminative power of chain structures in terms of fraud detection cannot be
made. However, the low number of produced alerts makes investigation feasible and suggests
potential under the observation that transaction chains are repeatedly present in analyzed fraud
cases.
Results were visualized and a selection was discussed with internal fraud experts. This led to the
identification of previously unknown settings that produced a high number of chains but did not
appear to emerge from fraudulent behavior. An example if given in Fig 4.5 . The star structure
consists of an asset management company in the center and its customers. On two key dates, a
massive amount of transactions is triggered from and two customer accounts. It remains unclear
if any of the occurring chains are intended as such, but given the massive activity on two single
days with transactions in a limited amount range, the emergence of numerous chains structures
is inevitable. The equally high number of incoming and outgoing transactions of the center node
and the wide variety of amounts led to a high number of matches in spite of the random structure
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Score (= number of chains) Employee (anonymized)
241 A
54 B
40 C
38 D
30 E
29 F
27 G
27 H
24 I
22 J
Table 4.1: The ten top scoring structures
identification in this special case. While the structure was considered to be explicable, the ex-
cessive use of MTT transactions in this setting was confirmed to be very unusual and suggested
for investigation at the compliance department. Although the transaction volume of this example
was unique, similar, but smaller structures were repeatedly found, which suggested the definition
of according exclusion criteria. This example illustrates how the identification and visualization
of patterns can lead to new, structure-based knowledge of the data which may be of use in a wide
variety of monitoring applications.
Figure 4.5: A chain structure of limited interest
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4.3.4 Identification of a Reference Fraud Case
Table 4.1 shows the ten top scoring structures in this case study.
Employee D turned out to be the perpetrator of the reference fraud case. The fact that the ref-
erence case is located in the ”Top 5” of fraud scores on the overall data set may indicate a good
precision. A discussion of this statement is given below. The evaluation also showed that the
ChainFinder retrieved a substantially higher number of the transactions in the case in comparison
with existing detection methods. With existing SQL-Filters, 4 transactions from this case triggered
alerts. Manual analysis then showed that the whole fraud case actually consisted of more than
100 fraudulent transactions. In contrast, ChainFinder at first successfully identified approximately
60% of the fraudulent transactions and more than 90% after conducting the additional external
chain search. It may be assumed that, had the delinquent been only slightly more careful, the
existing SQL-Filters wouldn’t have detected this quite extensive case but nevertheless it would
have been found by the ChainFinder — but this, of course, remains speculation.
It may be argued that the detection of a case basically consisting of chain structures is not a
big accomplishment given the ChainFinder algorithm. We fully agree on this statement. However,
as we decided on a pattern matching approach (as motivated in chapter 2), our intention is not
the identification of previously completely unknown structures, but to examine the potential of
relational model knowledge in addition to the non-relational model knowledge in existing fraud
detection monitors at Alphafin. The fact that our algorithm was able to find the reference case is
not surprising and goes without saying. The fact that it ranks among the Top 5 scoring structures
even with a trivial scoring mechanism (solely relying on the number of chains identified) however
shows the discriminative potential of this approach, which was previously unknown.
4.3.5 Evaluation Efficiency
All the chain structures which were proposed for investigation by the ChainFinder could be as-
sessed in approximately three working days. This basic first assessment included the classifica-
tion of each structure into low, medium and high interestingness level. Chain structures of low
interestingness essentially consisted of numerous isolated transaction pairs and triplets which ex-
hibited plausible reasons for the chain transactions. It has to be stated that this first assessment
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was not conducted by fraud experts at Alphafin due to the lack of resources, but rather served as
a preselection to reduce the number of patterns presented to experts to a minimum. This resulted
in 4 structures which were confirmed to be of particular interest by experts. A closer investiga-
tion of these structures was reported to be intended, but never happened to our knowledge. The
following section illustrates how the high scoring employee behaviors were analyzed by means
of two examples.
4.3.6 Example Investigation
This example demonstrates the investigation of both employee B, which reached a top score, and
employee A, which exhibits a known fraud case. It shows how visualization either intensifies or
weakens suspiciousness. For investigation, the structures resulting of all found MTT chains of
employee B and employee A, respectively, were visualized in TVIS, which could be done within
a few seconds (figure 4.6)
Figure 4.6: Chain structures for registrator A (a) and B (b). Accounts serving as accumulative targets are marked red.
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The visualization shows that although employee A has substantially less chains (the total num-
ber of logged chains is 38) than B (241 chains), his/her structure looks way more complex in
the network view. Within the structure, two accounts seem to operate as accumulative targets
(marked red), while numerous accounts occur as originators only. In the tabular data view in
TVIS (not visible in the Figure) it is straightforward to see that most of the originator accounts are
numbered accounts, which intensifies suspiciousness according to experts. In contrast, the huge
number of chains that B registered only show up in a structure of two simple triplets. This, of
course, doesn’t necessarily lead to the conclusion that this structure is not suspicious, particularly
because the originators and intermediaries are also numbered accounts3.
To get more insights, we make use of the dynamic visualization features of TVIS and add all MTT
transactions — for the investigated customers and triggered by the employee in question — that
are not part of a chain, but remain below the defined threshold. The idea behind this is straight-
forward: Extending the visualization this way reveals the general use of MTT transactions that
are small enough to escape operational control mechanisms by the according employee. This may
lead to possible conclusions about suspiciousness. Consider Figure 4.7:
The structure of the graph for A adds to the impression that money gets collected at (now
three) accumulative targets and from there gets transported to one or more external accounts.
The red node in the graph stands for 1-n external accounts (which were added in the extension
step) and cash-out transactions — basically money leaving the bank.
The graph for B shows a high MTT activity on one of the originator accounts from the underlying
structure. It may be of interest to further investigate if the high activity of this originator is appro-
priate; however, the graph does not contain any ”money flow direction” suggesting suspicious
transfers.
More information can be gained if — again just for the investigated customers — both MTT trans-
actions above the defined threshold and MTT transactions registered by other client advisors4 are
visualised. The assumption is the following: If a ”transaction path” is only used by one employee,
which only triggers MTT transactions below threshold th, the probability of a ”fraudulent path”
is higher than if other employees also use this ”path” and transactions higher than threshold th
3A numbered account is identified only by an arbitrary number instead of personal information for increased
anonymity of the account holder.
4While a customer is typically assigned to one, dedicated customer advisor, it is perfectly common that other customer
advisors occasionally trigger transactions substitutionally.
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Figure 4.7: All ”small” MTT transactions of the registrators in question
occur at least occasionally. For example, MTT transactions originating at a numbered account
belonging to a high-age person may indicate the fraudulent evacuation of money if triggered ex-
clusively by one employee and always staying below the critical threshold. The same transactions
triggered by several client advisors or above the threshold result in certain control mechanisms
to become effective and are therefore less suspicious. If we limit the visualization to transactions
registered ”by others” (or above threshold th), the figures change dramatically (figure 4.8)
While it is obvious that the graph on the right side stays similar (and therefore the transac-
tions are most probably founded in customer orders and carried out by different client advisors),
the graph on the left side changes substantially. Only few transaction in ”this environment” are
registered by others or above threshold th. These visualizations clearly add to the suspectedness
of employee A while lowering the ”interestingness” of employee B.
The manual work in the described investigation process motivates further automation. This
consideration led to the development of TMatch, which is evaluated in the following case studies
— however, with the focus on AML related topics.
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Figure 4.8: The same accounts for transactions registered by others
4.4 Case Studies II and III: AML/ Compliance Analysis
The combination of TMatch and TVIS was applied to two example AML-related problems.
In this thesis, the problem of money laundering merely serves as an alternative experimental ap-
plication area. We did not conduct an extensive analysis of the field, but solely relied on expert
input and on our basic understanding of the existing commercial AML solution at Alphafin. Pub-
lished research dedicated to analytical money laundering detection seems to be relatively rare
[Senator et al., 1995; Zhang et al., 2003; Wang and Yang, 2007]. Celent published a report on avail-
able commercial money laundering solutions in 2006 [Katkov, 2006]. As we only scratched the
surface of this huge topic, both case studies are highly explorative, and findings remain vague.
While one of the problem definitions was open and general, the second one was more focused on
a particular issue. As in case study I, the presented results are made anonymous and only very
limited detail information can be given.
Both experts and responsible customer advisors lack experience in assessing and investigating
relational structures. Therefore, the goal of this case study was to evaluate the following limited
aspects:
• Number of results produced
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Similar to the setting in the internal fraud study, it was completely unknown if TMatch
would be able to produce a reasonable number of results. Even if precision and recall esti-
mations may be very vague at this explorative stage , an adequate uncommonness of iden-
tified structures is a manifest requirement for producing results of interest for experts. An
approach either producing no results or, less restrictively configured, retrieving the large
part of analyzed accounts would not be able to fulfill this requirement.
• Expert assessment of interestingness
As a detailed investigation and terminal assessment of the legality of structures was out of
scope by far, informal expert assessments of interestingness and value were used to evalu-
ate the quality of sample results. At this point it has to be repeated that parameter settings,
which were discussed with experts, obviously influence the results produced. While eval-
uation of parameter setting and the approach as such is therefore inseparably combined,
experts were aware of this fact in their assessments.
• Estimated cost savings
Experts were asked to roughly estimate potential of TVIS and TMatch for efficiency and
effectiveness improvements in comparison to current tools and techniques.
The organization of the following two AML-related case studies is as follows: First, a short prob-
lem description, quantitative results and selected retrieved structures are presented in a nutshell
for both settings individually. After this, we consider the combined results of the two case stud-
ies according to the issues mentioned above. Possible implications of quantitative results are
identified and the statements that resulted from discussing the structures with experts are given.
Concluding, added value in terms of efficiency and effectiveness is considered. The high level
and tentativeness of the expert statements is due to the fact that a more detailed investigation is
a very elaborate undertaking including both compliance experts and responsible customer advi-
sors, which was infeasible for this project.
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4.4.1 Case Study II
Problem Description
This case study was conducted to evaluate the potential of supporting the processing of an audit
issue, which was raised for a dedicated business region. The goal was to gain general insights
and evaluate if our approach retrieves structure of interest for AML experts.
The analyzed region consisted of approximately 81700 accounts and 513000 transactions. Trans-
actions to and from external accounts were not used for the identification of the structures in
TMatch, but added to the visualizations. Exclusion from the structure identification is justified
by the fact that the quality of available data does not allow to identify external accounts uniquely
for each external transaction.
Two base pattern matchers were applied:
• A High Value Path pattern matcher which added each connection between nodes exceeding
and aggregated amount of 1 Mio CHF to the alert graph
• A Sum Chain Pattern matcher (based on the ChainFinder) which added Sum Chains ex-
ceeding an aggregate value of 10000 CHF to the alert graph
Weakly and stronlgy components were identified and logged separately5 .
Results
The following number of components were identified for the different settings:
High value path components (strongly connected) with Size ≥ 4: 10 Components were iden-
tified. Table 4.2 shows the number of identified components and their size. Only 0.06% of all
analyzed accounts are part of a high value path component.
Figure 4.9 shows the biggest component of size 13. The size and density of this component
is very unusual and was confirmed to be of high interest for AML and Compliance issues.The
account marked red is a numbered account. The intense interconnections may indicate that the
5A component is strongly connected if for each pair of nodes ni,nj in the component there is a path from ni to nj , and
a path from nj to ni where the path from ni to nj may contain different nodes and edges than the path from nj to ni (see
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994] In contrast to [Wasserman and Faust, 1994] we denote each connected component which is
not strongly connected as weakly connected for simplicity
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Numer of components Size
1 13
1 7
1 6
1 5
6 4
Number of components: 10 Number of nodes within components 55
Table 4.2: Strongly connected high value path components
involved accounts have the same beneficial owner. While this is not necessarily indicating suspi-
cious activity, it is of interest whether the assumptions this pattern suggests match the knowledge
and KYC6 documentation of the responsible customer advisors. If the observed behaviour cannot
be justified with the available information in the client history, the KYC principle may be violated
and a detailed investigation is necessary.
Figure 4.9: A component of high interest containing a numbered account (marked red)
6”Know Your Customer”
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Numer of components Size
1 254
1 24
1 13
2 11
1 10
Number of components: 6 Number of nodes within components: 323
Table 4.3: Weakly connected high value path components
High value path components (weakly connected) with Size ≥ 10: Due to the lower restric-
tions of weakly connected component, the minimal size was set to 10 nodes. Table 4.3 shows the
number of identified components and their size.
The very large size of one component proposes experimenting with more restrictive high value
paths in future. Extensive expert investigation, which was out of scope in this case study, may
help to find the most suitable parameter settings. Figure 4.10 gives an example of a weak compo-
nent of size 11. The component visualization was enriched with edges below the threshold level
of one million for investigation.
Figure 4.10: Example weakly connected high value path component
Sum chain components (strongly connected): The use of an account as a mere passage point
may result in sum chains. These pattern may have perfectly legal reasons, for example emerge
from dedicated company structures or may have illegal motivation (in particular layering [Al-
tenkirch, 2006]) The idea of this analysis, combining the ChainFinder and TMatch, was to evalu-
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Numer of components Size
1 16
1 6
1 5
8 3
Number of components: 11 Number of nodes within components: 51
Table 4.4: Strongly connected sum chain components
ate if complex structures consisting of Sum Chains exist, and if yes, how common they are. Table
4.4 shows the number of identified components and their size.
Figure 4.11 visualizes the biggest component of size 16. The star structure, which is indicated
in the component scoring by a high maximum centrality (1), is of limited interest. The sum chains
may have randomly occurred.
Figure 4.11: A strongly connected sum chain component of limited interest
In contrast, Figure 4.12 shows a strongly connected component (for internal nodes) which is
of high interest. The structure exhibits numerous intersecting high value sum chains (simplified
numbers), which is very uncommon.
Fig. 4.13 shows the same structure enriched with connections not being part of sum chains.
Sum chain components (weakly connected) with size≥ 5 Table 4.5 shows the number of identi-
fied components and their size. The presence of a component of size 753 is striking. A component
of this size is not suitable for investigation neither for TVIS in the current release nor for a human
expert. The proposed way to evaluate such a component is therefore to run a more restrictively
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Figure 4.12: A strongly connected sum chain component
Figure 4.13: Enriched component visualization with all transactions
Numer of components Size
1 735
1 16
1 13
1 8
6 7
4 6
4 5
Number of components 18 Number of nodes within components: 858
Table 4.5: Weakly connected sum chain components
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configured instance of TMatch on this component and analyse the resulting subcomponents. The
fact that one huge component repeatedly occurred in a number of settings (cf. Table 4.3 and 4.7),
proposes the extension of TVIS to provide optimized visualization of big components (see chap-
ter 5). The component of size 16 exhibits another complex structure consisting of sum chains
(Figure 4.14).When the minimal amount for sum chains was raised to one million, 13 components
remained (Table 4.6).
Figure 4.14: An example weak sum chain component
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Numer of components Size
2 10
2 7
4 6
5 5
Number of components 13 Number of nodes within components: 83
Table 4.6: Weakly connected sum chain components II
4.4.2 Case Study III
Problem description
This case study was conducted to evaluate the potential in a particular issue, which is described
in this section.
The focus lies on a defined customer type we denote as Uncommon Wealth Customers (UWC).
UWCs are registered as wealthy private customers in the bank and have according bank accounts.
However, and this is what makes them uncommon, instead of using their accounts primarily for
asset management as intended for this account type, UWCs exhibit massive business activity.
This phenomenon is relevant in terms of AML, in particular for the Know Your Customer Princi-
ple (KYC). It has been observed that UWCs may operate complex structures of private accounts,
representing company conglomerates. As this happens in an improper client segment, the re-
sponsible customer advisors often do not have sufficient knowledge of these behaviors and the
underlying structures. Different parts of a company conglomerate making use of UWC accounts
may be ministered by different customer advisors at different organizational units, which can
have the effect that no one sees the whole picture. A project has been launched at Alphafin to gain
more knowledge of this phenomenon. UWCs, or, more precisely UWC candidates are identified
by defining SQL-Filters searching for accordant customer profiles. Currently, structures of interest
are found manually on the basis identified UWCs. For example, UWC candidates exhibit higher
numbers and total amounts of transactions as the typical customer in this segment. To keep the
number of returned results manageable for manual analysis, the thresholds used for UWC detec-
tion are typically very restrictive. The case study at hand was aimed at evaluating the potential of
TMatch in finding interesting interconnections between UWC accounts, that is, highly connected
components which may indicate company conglomerates. As a considerably larger amount of
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Numer of components Size
1 982
1 39
1 11
1 10
3 9
1 8
3 7
4 6
5 5
9 4
Number of components 29 Number of nodes within components: 1081 (5%)
Table 4.7: Base UWC components
data can be analyzed in comparison to the manual process, filter settings for UWCs may be de-
fined more broadly, reducing the risk of excluding true UWCs from investigation. Two sets of
UWC accounts were used in this case study:
• Base UWC set
This set corresponds to a relatively broad definition of UWC which was developed at Al-
phafin and later narrowed down to lower the number of returned results. It contains ap-
proximately 22000 UWC candidates.
• Core UWC set
This set represents the narrowed down definition of UWCs. The core set is a subset of the
base UWCs with especially high values in turnover and other activity measures. The core
set contains approximately 3800.
Results
In a first run, the base UWC set was used as a base view, while the core set served as the StartSet.
With a minimal component size of 4, a total of 29 components was identified (Table 4.7). One
of those component exhibits a size of over 900 nodes. It however, exhibited a low score for den-
sity, indicating that it represents a number of possibly dense substructures merged by occasional
transactions which may not represent a relationship of adequate importance for this analysis. This
suggests further experimentation with TMatch configuration, for example by increasing the min-
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imal amount or number of transactions for a link to be considered. Purposeful experimentation
required a detailed assessment for this component which was infeasible in the course of this case
study. The second largest component is of size 39 and clearly outstanding in terms of density. It
is illustrated in Fig. 4.15.
Figure 4.15: A UWC component with very high density
This structure was confirmed by AML experts to be a conglomerate which was previously
identified in manual analysis. We were reported that experts had identified approximately 100
accounts belonging to this structure. The fact that TMatch only found 39 of them indicates that
our definition of the base UWC set may be too restrictive and motivates further experimentation
by adapting the definition of the base graph and the configuration of TMatch.
The second run was solely based on the core UWC set as a base graph without focus on a ded-
icated start set. Setting the minimal component size to 5 resulted in 40 components. To evaluate
the commonness of small components, the numbers of components of size 4 and 3 were addition-
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Number of components Size
1 61
1 41
1 39
1 29
1 27
1 19
2 17
1 15
1 13
1 12
1 11
3 9
3 8
6 7
8 6
8 5
Number of components 40 Number of nodes within components: 48
Table 4.8: Core UWC components
ally calculated.The number of 36 components with size 4 and 70 components with size 3 indicates
that smaller components are more common, but still infrequent.
Figure 4.16 shows the distribution of density7 for the identified components. It reveals that
very few components have a very high density. Even among the five most dense components,
density decreases substantially from component (a) to component (e) as can be seen in figure 4.16.
Sample reviews of some accounts in structure (b) showed conform beneficial owners within the
structure which was expected by the responsible expert. A case where more than one beneficial
owner was involved in one of the most dense structures was reported to be of particular interest.
This led to the considerations of possible applications of TMatch mentioned in 4.4.3. Not the
most dense, but biggest components are pictured in figure 4.18. In (a), subgroups of clustered
accounts are clearly identifiable. While in (b) and (d), the central accounts are mainly connected
via ”peripheral” accounts, there exist direct connections between the nodes with high centrality
— (e) exhibits a star structure with one prominent node.
7Network density denotes the proportion of edges in an network relative to the total number
possible E
N(N−1) where E is the number of edges and N is the number of nodes in the graph.
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Figure 4.16: The density distribution of core components
4.4.3 Discussion
Number of Results Produced
In all experimental TMatch runs, the number of results produced suggest that the structures
looked for occur in the data, but are highly infrequent, which was previously unknown. Of
course, the number of results is highly dependent on the exact configuration, but the chosen
setting seem to be a reasonable starting point. Figure 4.19 shows the ratio of nodes being part
of components Nc
Na
where Nc is the total number of nodes in all identified components and Na is
the total number of analyzed nodes. The numbers suggest a substantially higher connectivity be-
tween UWC accounts in comparison to the more heterogeneous population in the region-based
analysis. The core UWCs in turn are more likley to be connected among each other than the
broader defined base UWCs. This corresponds to the existing business assumptions of the char-
acteristics of UWCs, which is originally based on few sample cases. The fact that Nc is typically
substantially smaller than Na motivates the following considerations when comparing TMatch to
currently implemented methods:
As in internal fraud detection, existing detection methods in AML and compliance heavily
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 4.17: The top five density structures
rely on filters focusing on single accounts. To keep the number of alerts at a manageable level,
filters are configured very restrictively. Threshold setting is therefore typically motivated by the
number of returned results, and not by model knowledge on money laundering patterns. For
example, only accounts with a cash turnover of more than 2 million per year may be investigated
as a lower threshold may produce too many results. If this can be done without considerably
lowering recall remains an open question. As connected components (with dedicated properties
concerning minimal size, density and so on) seem to be infrequent, the basic population ana-
lyzed may be substantially larger. While a population of 20’000 accounts with a cash turnover of
more than 500’000 per year may be out of scope for manual investigation (which often implies
analyzing the accounts connections), it can be readily presented to TMatch, which may return a
manageable number of interesting structures consisting of accounts in the basic population. These
considerations are based on the assumption that the information on relations between accounts
of interest generates an added value for investigation. To prove the validity of this assumption is
130 Chapter 4. Application and Evaluation
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 4.18: The top five size structures
a complex task and may require extensive working experience. Some statements concerning this
issues are given in the following section.
Expert Statements
In the explorative case study II, the responsible AML expert looked at a number of selected re-
sults from both the high value path and sum chain analysis and reported his first impressions. It
was confirmed that the identified structures were of high interest and suggested a more detailed
investigation. It was further confirmed that the use of TMatch could lead to insights in terms of
occurring structures which is not possible in similar coverage with the current process. Part of the
produced results were used for an audit report. In the more specific case study III, we discussed a
number of results with the expert responsible for the UWC project. The findings in this discussion
are as follows:
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Figure 4.19: The ratio of nodes in components for the different TMatch runs
The focus on patterns of interrelated accounts must not lead to the disregard of accounts with
no or only little interaction with other intra-company accounts in investigation. It goes without
saying that “internally isolated”accounts may be likewise involved in activities of regulatory in-
terest. Money launderers , for example, may purposely distribute their activities beyond as many
company borders as possible to reduce traceability. On the other hand, the following issues moti-
vate automated analysis of intra-company structures:
• Currently established detection methods in Alphafin ignore intra-company structures. The
assumption that money laundering or other activities of regulatory interest never happen
within a fincancial insititution may be true or false. The results produced in this case study
suggest that ignorance of those structures may not be justified.
• Manual identification of the relations between accounts of interest is a crucial element in the
manual investigation of alerts from existing detection systems. This step can be partially
automated by TMatch. With improved data quality for transactions from and to external
parties, unique external accounts can be readily included in a TMatch analysis.
• Regulators may claim that it is particularly critical if a money laundering activity goes un-
detected where a significant proportion of the underlying structures lies within a company.
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Generally speaking, a financial institute is “responsible ” for its customers, which also in-
cludes activity among them.
• As seen in the example of UWC analysis, not only explicitly illegal activity may be of inter-
est. Risk/return ratio estimation may exact more detailed understanding of the characteris-
tics of a customer type, which may be supported by TMatch and TVIS.
• Matching automatically identified structures against the information in according customer
history entries may reveal if the responsible customer advisor is clued up to the customers
activities or if the KYC principle is not satisfied.
We repeatedly mention that a pattern was “confirmed to be of interest for experts”. Admit-
tedly this statement is very imprecise. Given the complexity of the topic and the limited expert
resources mentioned before, a more detailed assessment could generally not be done without pre-
tending more information than is actually there.
The case studies are able to indicate potential. The generation of precise quantitative results on the
performance of the system requires years of experience in productive use by dedicated analysts
as the examples ADS [Kirkland et al., 1998] and FAIS [Senator et al., 1995] show.
Estimated Cost Savings
Current compliance checks typically involve elaborate manual investigation of relationships with
other customers and external accounts based on tabular data. We were repeatedly told that cur-
rently, the developement of an overview concerning a customers direct and indirect transactional
environment may take estimated 3 to 5 days in the presence of moderate complexity. In contrast,
TVIS provides an equivalent overview within minutes. An adequate TMatch analysis further
automates the investigation process and may improve efficiency. While it has to be stated that
enabling the application of TVIS and TMatch in compliance checks will require considerable em-
ployee training and even rough cost saving estimation is not possible with our limited knowledge,
the potential in raising efficieny is evident. A recent analysis involving 140 accounts was reported
to have taken months. After learning about TVIS and TMatch, an expert at Alphafin estimated
that the same analysis could have been done within a few days.
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4.5 Synthetic data evaluation
4.5.1 Criticism
A number of publications discusses the generation of simulated data for the training and evalua-
tion of fraud detection systems [Lundin et al., 2002; Barse et al., 2003; Cohen and Morrison, 2004].
Where real world data is not available, using simulated data is the only way to evaluate a system.
In the case of (supervised) data mining approaches, the simulated data is used to train a system
for (assumed) later use with real world data [Barse et al., 2003].
However, if the knowledge is available for simulating fraud cases in sufficient quality, it may be
more effective to convert it to model knowledge and build a pattern-matching based detection
system instead of making the detour of calculating a model.
Apart from that, generating high quality simulation data may be a very demanding task. Based
on the proposals in [Lundin et al., 2002], we designed a basic transaction simulator for the repro-
duction of real world payment networks based on a seed of analyzed real world data.
The Java Transaction Simulator (JTS) works as follows: A subset of real world data is chosen and
serves as a seed (as proposed in [Barse et al., 2003]).
In a first step, we summarized the transactions between each pair of accounts in the seed.
Consider the transactions shown in the upper left of Figure 4.20 as an example. There are 3 trans-
actions from account A to account B and 1 transaction from Account B to A. The behavior between
those two accounts could, hence, be summarized as {3,−1}. To additionally include information
about transaction amounts, the transactions were bagged. Assuming two bags (bag1 ∈ 1-500$,
bag2 ∈ 500-1000$) a summary of {2bag1, 1bag2,−1bag1} refines the previous summary with trans-
action size information.
Second, we clustered the pairwise behavior patterns according to their summaries. Each clus-
ter (shown as red numbers in Figure 4.20 on page 134) represents a generalized behavior between
two accounts, e.g. ”numerous small transactions” (type 1) or ”few big transactions” (type 2).
Third, we replaced all the transactions between two accounts with the corresponding pairwise
behavior cluster number (shown in Figure 4.20 on the upper right). Hence, we characterized each
account by the bag of behavior types it is involved in.
Fourth, we clustered the accounts according to their behavior characterization resulting in
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groups of account types (green in Figure 4.20).
To generate the synthetic data set, we would now generate the desired number of accounts with
the same distribution of account types as given by the seed (i.e., the distribution of accounts in
the seed per cluster denoted by the green number). For each account, relationships are gener-
ated using the distribution of behavior observed in its cluster (i.e., according to the distribution
of red numbers in the account’s cluster). The result is a transaction network with a behavioral
distribution akin to the one of the seed.
Figure 4.20: Synthetic data generation with JTS
Implementation and a simple evaluation is described in [Galliker, 2008]. Experiments with
real world data seeds showed reasonable results, but also made clear that extensive further de-
velopment and improvements are necessary for the simulation of realistic payment behavior of a
highly heterogeneous and complex population. Due to the issues mentioned above and the fact
that real world data was available for evaluation, we decided to abandon work on simulated data
improvement and to limit synthetic data evaluation on runtime.
Publications introducing new pattern matching algorithms heavily rely on runtime evalua-
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tions [Gallagher, 2006b]. In our case, the focus does not lie on the theoretical aspects of the pat-
tern matching algorithms, but on their application in an information system solving a real world
problem. Therefore, our approaches are not optimized in terms of runtime performance, but in
terms of feasibility under given real world conditions. The achievement of this objective cannot
be measured by means of algorithm runtime. Additionally, the actual runtime in our case studies
in Alphafin is primarily determined by factors beyond the system and the area of our influence.
In particular, data base and network speed are crucial factors. Highly varying load, changing data
base index structures and connection interruptions make accurate runtime evaluations impossi-
ble. The following runtime evaluations are therefore of limited expressive power and are rather
given for the sake of completeness.
4.5.2 ChainFinder Runtime Evaluation
While the Java-based implementation of the ChainFinder with its incremental loading of data us-
ing lightweight SQL-statements and intermediary results logging was the preferred choice when
analyzing real data at Alphafin, the SQL based implementation features a considerably better
runtime performance when evaluating synthetic data. This is evident as the extensive commu-
nication with the DBMS in incremental loading leads to a considerable overhead. If the limited
functionality and configurability of the SQL version is sufficient and the infrastructure is resilient
and stable enough to reliably handle complex queries for the amount of data analyzed, runtime
can be reduced considerably. Figure 4.21 shows the average runtime of the two ChainFinder
versions for approximately 370’000 transactions generated with JTS for different numbers of ana-
lyzed chain root nodes. The difference in runtime is notable.
4.5.3 TMatch Runtime Evaluation
TMatch was evaluated on different sets of random transactions between varying numbers of ac-
counts. Figure 4.22 shows overall time consumption of TMatch for different numbers of edges. As
the x-coordinate shows the node-to-edge ratio, the respective graphs get more sparse when mov-
ing from left to right on a plot line. However, as the graph is a multigraph, network density can
only be approximated. The figure shows that in particular for large numbers of edges, runtime
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Figure 4.21: Chainfinder runtime evaluation
is low for a very sparse and an approximately fully connected graph as the number of identified
components is very low in both cases. There is a clear peak at a node-to-edge ratio of 0.1, e.g.
100’000 nodes and 1 million edges in a multigraph. In a real world scenario, the base graph and
search options will typically be chosen such that components are found but occur relatively rarely,
so the two extreme cases will never be met in practice.
Figure 4.22: The TMatch node-to-edge ratio time consumption graph
Figure 4.23 shows time and memory consumption for the typically most costly expander com-
ponent in its three implementations RAM, DB and ThreadedDB. While memory consumption is
unsurprisingly considerably higher for the RAM based version, it is interesting to see that the
ThreadedDB implementation exhibits a better runtime performance where the graph tends to be
relatively sparse.
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Figure 4.23: The expander node-to-edge ratio to time consumption graph with 1M edges

5
Future Work
Possible and promising ways to go from where we are today are manifold. In the following,
selected issues are discussed.
5.1 Extended TVIS User Group Customization
The requirements for the visualization component vary between different potential user groups
which were identified in the course of the project. In internal fraud, fine-grained analysis of
relatively few data at a time is common. AML-related investigations typically require more data,
but an aggregated transaction view may be sufficient. An expert using TVIS as an investigation
tool needs more elaborate features than a client advisor requesting visualizations for KYC. Given
a number of possible scenarios for the productive use of both TMatch and TVIS, customization
and further integration into business processes becomes necessary. Supporting the transformation
from research stage to a productive solution, which partly already has taken place — in particular
for the visualization component — is part of future work.
5.2 Automated Exclusivity Scoring
As described in the internal fraud case study, we found that structures almost solely resulting
from one customer advisor using MTT transactions below the defined operational threshold may
be a valuable indicator for possible fraud. The manual process of structure exclusivity assessment
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could be automated by an appropriate scoring model. TMatch may be readily extended with
exclusivity scoring. This has not been done due to the focus switch mentioned above in the
course of the project. Of course, exclusivity scoring may not only be used in combination with
Chain and Smurfing structures, but with a wider range of structures in terms of transaction types,
involved accounts and so on.
5.3 Structural Peer Group Analysis
Peer Group Analysis detects changes in behavior in relation to a set of similar instances, the
peer group [Weston et al., 2008]. This is typically done on the single account/ aggregated events
(in our case transactions) level. Peer Group Analysis could be combined with relational pattern
matching to profile and monitor customer advisors with regard to the use of transaction patterns
of interest. For instance, the average number of well-grounded, legal transaction chains may
vary depending on the set of customers an employee is in charge of. Client advisors with similar
customer sets in terms of those transaction patterns could build a peer group to account for that
fact. According to the nature of the data, peer groups may be defined by organizational structures
(if they correspond to similar pattern frequency) or calculated in a prior clustering. This approach
could also allow for a straightforward integration of existing monitoring results as additional
features for the peer group analysis. For illustration, we propose a possible minimal feature set
for each client advisor in Peer Group Analysis:
• number of Single/Sum Transaction Chains (ChainFinder scores)
• structural relationships between occurring Single/Sum Transaction Chains (TMatch scores)
• structural relationships between all triggered transactions of type MTT (TMatch scores)
• exclusivity scores (see above)
• results of existing monitoring results (details are confidential)
As in traditional peer group analysis, significant deviations from the behavior of the peer group
could be detected and trigger an alert. It has to be noted that the definition of significant deviation
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may not be a trivial task, in particular for the structural features. As mentioned above, we repeat-
edly experienced that the transaction network at hand is highly heterogeneous. Abrupt behavior
changes of customers (and therewith of their customer advisors) seem to be quite common — a
characteristic which handicaps the use of Peer Group Analysis as argued above. Extensive anal-
ysis is necessary to decide if the inclusion of transaction patterns which suggest a high discrimi-
native power (as transaction chains) may resolve this problem. We implemented an experimental
version of this approach. However, it soon became clear that because of extensive reorganiza-
tions and renaming afflicting the relevant data, a reasonable evaluation was not straightforward.
The necessary extensive support from Alphafin was not available, in particular because the de-
manded research focus had switched to other topics in the meantime. Therefore, an appropriate
implementation and evaluation of this approach remains future work.
5.4 Connection Probability
In both fraud detection and AML, unusual connections between accounts are of special interest.
In the existing fraud investigation process, experts make use of their experience to spot connec-
tions which seem unusual in visual analysis. The customer history information of involved ac-
counts is then checked for hints explaining the transaction(s) in question. For instance, recurring
high amount payments from a machine manufacturer to a component supplier may be perfectly
plausible, while the same payments may require a closer look if the beneficiary is, say, a tourist
agency. A possible way to support this procedure is the automated identification of unusual con-
nections1 , in terms of their mere existence or in terms of their characteristics. This approach has
been considered but was prohibited by the lack of high quality industry type codes or similar in-
formation available. There are efforts to integrate according data fields into the data warehouse.
Identifying outliers in terms of connection probability may be a valuable complement to other
fraud detection measures. A first implementation may focus on a single-edge representation of
the transaction graph for probability calculation and therefore be limited to aggregated transac-
tion amounts. However we expect that more detailed information should be used for reasonable
results — in particular height and volatility of payment amounts, number and regularity of single
1This problem is related to the field of link analysis
142 Chapter 5. Future Work
transactions and similar.
6
Limitations and Conclusions
6.1 Limitations
In [Whitrow et al., 2009], the authors mention that, unavoidably, ”any particular [fraud] study is
always a snapshot in time and space” and many of their conclusions ”will therefore be tentative”.
This is undoubtedly also true for our work. The collaboration with an industry partner allowed
us to gain numerous practical insights and approach the subject from a pragmatic view. However,
it entails that the proposed solutions are tailored to our industry partner and generalizability may
be limited.
Heavily based on available model knowledge, the presented approach is, by definition, not ideal
for finding completely new (or unknown) fraudulent behaviour, although the work with TVIS
showed some potential for exploring previously unknown patterns.
We focused on Chain Transactions and Smurfing in the design of our approach1. Of course, we
cannot rule out that fraud is possible without generating any of those patterns (while avoiding
existing threshold monitors as well). If fraudulent transactions are indistinguishable from normal
transactions in respect of all the information in the available data, all data-based fraud-finding
solutions fail.
1It, however, has to be stated that the ChainFinder — in spite of its name — may be adapted to match completely
different patterns where the relations between attribute values are more important than specific values.
144 Chapter 6. Limitations and Conclusions
6.2 Conclusions
In this thesis, we consider a wide variety of analytical fraud detection approaches and discuss
their applicability in different settings by proposing a unifying framework.
We introduce the special case of internal fraud and its characteristics in the collaborating financial
institution. A system based on graph pattern matching and visualization is proposed. We evalu-
ated the potential of the approach in example case studies at Alphafin.
The visualization component was transferred from an experimental prototype to a productive
tool in the course of this thesis. Two releases were rolled out at Alphafin, a further releases is
planned for the following year, and the productive integration of the detection component is cur-
rently discussed.
Anyhow, we were not able to proceed as fast and far as desired. The circumstances were chal-
lenging for conducting research. Substantial work was required to set the stage such as designing
and implementing the visualization component, design and optimization of table views and an-
alyzing undocumented data properties, to just name a few. During the first two years of the
project, we did not get direct access to the data, but had to rely solely on expert input. We were
bound to the available infrastructure and resources in Alphafin, which limited our action flexibil-
ity. Personal fluctuations and the fact that no business expert resources were officially allocated
to support the one-man project was severe in particular in the lack of labeled examples (identifi-
cation knowledge). As a consequence, expressivity of evaluation was limited.
At the same time, these aggravating circumstances were appealing for a thesis on the interface
between research and industry.
Both the design and the implementation of our approaches were focused on the pragmatic chal-
lenges we met. This led to a relatively straightforward solution.
As stated earlier, we do not see our main contribution in developing yet another sophisticated de-
tection approach, but in considering the different perspectives and goals in research and industry
— and finding a way to combine the two.
A
Implementation
A.1 TVIS Implementation
TVIS consists of a java server and a client. The server is running on Apache Tomcat and is re-
sponsible for the communication with the database and processing of the data for the clients. The
client is based on the MVC-pattern and makes use of a third party visualization library (YFiles
in a first version, Tom Sawyer in later version for organizational reasons). A prototype was de-
livered to Alphafin, further developments were done at Alphafin and resulted in a closed source
software.
A.2 ChainFinder Implementation
The ChainFinder mainly used in this thesis is implemented in Java, making use of JDBC con-
nections. A faster, but less flexible implementation was done in SQL. Both implementations are
described in a nutshell in the following sections.
A.2.1 Java Implementation
In the following, a short description for the most important classes of th e Java implementation
are given.
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Field Example Value Description
String CHAIN TYPE ”SINGLE”/”SUM” Type of chains to be matched
String WINDOW SIZE ”7” In days
String MINIMUM CHAIN LENGTH ”2” In number of transactions
String DIRECTION ”FORWARD”/ Search direction; root nodes
”REVERSE”/ are either sources, targets or
”BIDIRECTIONAL” intermediaries in chains
boolean RANDOM NODE ID true/false Random structure identification (RSI)
boolean MAX CLONE NUMBER 4 Max of allowed clones for RSI
double FUZZY EQUALS MIN RATIO 0.9 For fuzzy amount matching
double FUZZY EQUALS MAX RATIO 1.1 For fuzzy amount matching
boolean REGISTRATOR TRACK true/false Check for same registrator within chains
Table A.1: ChainFinder configuration fields
algorithm.ChainFinder
A singleton class controlling algorithm runs via a start method that takes the root node as an
argument and ensures that successor nodes are expanded as long as there are any.
data.SingleChainNode, data.SumChainNode
These two classes implement the data.Node interface and represent a node in single and sum
chain mode respectively. For example, a difference between the two types of nodes is that Sum-
ChainNodes provide a method to calculate the TimeLineScore.
data.SingleChainParticle, data.SumChainParticle
These two classes implement the data.Particle interface and account for the different attributes
and behaviours of a particle, in particular in updating, cloning, and logging information.
data.Configuration
A simple configuration class for setting ChainFinder behaviour. The configuration information in
this class may be readily managed by property files or a graphical user interface. The following
table gives a short overview of the most relevant configuration fields in ChainFinder. Additional
configuration fields for specifying the DB connection, tables and field names as well as prepared
SQL statements are given but not listed here.
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Utility classes
A number of classes is responsible for managing DB connections and looging functionality (tools.DBConnector,
tools.LogDBConnector,data.ResultLogger)
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A.2.2 SQL Implementation
A simple, fast implementation of the ChainFinder can be done in SQL. Functionalty limitations
may be resolved by using more expressive languages as PL/SQL (which was prohibited in our
setting). A basic SQL query for finding a chain of length 2 may look like this:
Select * from root.trx as trx1, root.trx as trx2
where trx1.ORIG = ’A’ and
trx1.BEN = trx2.ORIG and
trx2.AMOUNT between (trx1.AMOUNT*0.9) and (trx1.AMOUNT*1.0) and
trx2.DATE between (trx1.DATE) and (trx1.DATE + 5 days);
A.3 TMatch Implementation
TMatch is also implemented in Java, making use of Ibatis for the mapping of SQL DBs and objects
in Java. Main packages are the following:
NodeSetExpanders
A number of NodeSetExpanders is avaliable for expanding nodes in the search of interesting
structures. Threaded and non-threaded implementations are available for DB-based and RAM-
based expansion.
ComponentFinder
This class is responsible for the identification of components in a graph
AlertGraph
This class represents the AlertGraph holding pattern matching results from the pattern matching
steps
A.4 TMatch Graphical User Interface 149
ScoreModels and Scorers
Classes in this family manage the scoring of components. New score models can be added dy-
namically. A description how this is done is provided in [Moll, 2009]
Utiliy classes
A number of utility classes are available for Unit Test, Logging, Data organization and other
required support functions.
Configuration
The configuration of TMatch is organized in a number of property files. Default properties are
given in TMatch.default.properties
A.4 TMatch Graphical User Interface
A simple Graphical User Interface has been implemented for demonstration reasons. After pre-
sented a welcome screen outlining the overall process (Figure A.1), the user is guided through the
basic configuration of the search. A number of predefined search profiles can be chosen (Figure
A.2). In expert mode all settings can be configured directly. (Figure A.3) Based on expert configu-
ration, the creation of new search profiles for the normal user is possible. Results, that is, retrieved
components are shown in the result display. The total score field can be expanded to reveal the
detailed scores (Figure A.4). A simple visualization function is provided - detailed investigation
is done in TVIS.
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Figure A.1: TMatch GUI welcome screen
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Figure A.2: TMatch GUI search profile configuration screen
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Figure A.3: TMatch GUI expert configuration screen
Figure A.4: TMatch GUI result display screen
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A.5 Example TMatch Score Results
Table A.2 and A.3 give detailed TMatch results as discussed in case study III (Section 4.4.2 on page
124). Due to the high level explorative character of first experiments and performance reasons, the
calculated scores were limited to a minimal subset of subgraph1 size, degree density and maximal
degree centrality. In table A.3, displayed components are limited to a size > 5.
1denoted ”component” in the scoring
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Component Size Degree Density Max Centrality
0 982 0.001 0.042
1 10 0.144 0.333
2 39 0.101 0.408
3 9 0.139 0.25
4 3 0.333 0.5
5 5 0.3 0.625
6 6 0.233 0.3
7 8 0.25 0.643
8 9 0.25 0.5
9 5 0.25 0.5
10 3 0.333 0.5
11 5 0.35 0.625
12 5 0.3 0.5
13 11 0.127 0.5
14 3 0.667 0.75
15 7 0.238 0.583
16 3 0.833 1
17 5 0.2 0.375
18 6 0.367 0.6
19 4 0.333 0.5
20 3 0.333 0.5
21 3 0.5 0.5
22 4 0.5 1
23 3 0.333 0.5
24 3 0.5 0.75
25 3 0.833 1
26 7 0.381 0.583
27 3 0.333 0.5
28 4 0.5 0.833
29 4 0.25 0.5
30 9 0.111 0.25
31 3 0.833 1
32 3 0.667 0.75
33 6 0.167 0.5
34 4 1 1
35 3 0.667 0.75
36 3 0.333 0.5
37 3 0.667 0.75
38 3 0.333 0.5
39 6 0.267 0.4
40 4 0.333 0.667
41 3 0.667 0.75
42 3 0.333 0.5
43 3 0.5 0.75
44 4 0.5 0.667
45 4 0.417 0.5
46 3 0.333 0.5
47 3 0.333 0.5
48 3 0.333 0.5
49 7 0.143 0.333
50 4 0.333 0.667
Table A.2: All UWC component scores
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Component Size Degree Density Max Centrality
0 12 0.121 0.409
1 7 0.214 0.417
2 13 0.096 0.208
3 17 0.121 0.594
5 29 0.039 0.188
6 39 0.056 0.342
10 27 0.088 0.731
11 15 0.105 0.286
12 8 0.268 0.857
17 61 0.03 0.083
18 9 0.542 0.875
20 41 0.059 0.388
23 9 0.333 0.563
24 7 0.214 0.333
27 11 0.364 0.55
30 9 0.472 0.688
31 17 0.154 0.406
36 19 0.137 0.5
40 7 0.238 0.5
43 8 0.179 0.357
48 6 0.333 0.6
49 6 0.2 0.5
59 8 0.143 0.286
60 6 0.267 0.5
64 6 0.333 0.5
70 7 0.238 0.583
77 6 0.733 1
81 7 0.405 0.833
82 6 0.4 0.8
85 6 0.267 0.4
86 6 0.2 0.4
141 7 0.238 0.417
Table A.3: Core UWC component scores (Size > 5)
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